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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine if, and under what conditions, autobiographical 
memory (AM) supported by the hippocampus benefits theory of mind (ToM). To this end, I 
attempted to address two main research questions: (a) Are AM difficulties caused by early-onset 
hippocampal damage associated with impaired performance on standard measures of ToM 
(Experiment 1)? (b) Is AM and the brain regions that support it involved to a greater extent in 
imagining the experiences of personally known others compared to unknown others 
(Experiments 2, 3, and 4)? In Experiment 1, ToM abilities were examined in H.C., a young 
woman with impaired AM development due to early hippocampal damage. H.C. performed at 
the same level as controls on a wide range of ToM tests. These findings suggest that normal AM 
development is not critical for the development or expression of ToM, at least as measured by 
standard tests. In Experiment 2, healthy individuals were scanned with fMRI to test whether 
different neural and cognitive mechanisms support imagining the experiences of personally 
known others (pToM) versus unknown others (ToM). There was greater neural overlap between 
AM and pToM compared to pToM and ToM. Furthermore, a direct comparison between pToM 
and ToM revealed that midline regions associated with AM predominated during pToM, whereas 
more lateral regions associated with semantic memory predominated during ToM. These 
findings suggest that there are multiple routes to ToM and the extent to which AM is recruited 
depends, at least in part, on whether the target person is personally known. Experiment 3 
corroborated the neuroimaging results reported in Experiment 2 by showing that H.C. was 
impaired at producing detailed descriptions of events relating to her own past as well as events 
relating to personally known others. In contrast, she was intact at describing events relating to 
unknown others. Experiment 4 explored the neural basis of H.C.’s performance on AM, pToM, 
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and ToM. Functional MRI analyses revealed that measures of percent signal change and 
functional connectivity were equivalent between H.C. and controls across all conditions. These 
finding suggest that BOLD fMRI cannot necessarily distinguish between preserved and impaired 
behavioural performance in developmental amnesia. Overall, these results contribute 
substantially to our current understanding of the functional and neural relationship between AM 
and ToM, and add to the literature suggesting that the hippocampus plays a broader role in 
cognition beyond that of recalling past events. 
  
iv 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
Firstly, I would like to thank and express a deep appreciation to my supervisor, Dr. 
Shayna Rosenbaum. Your guidance and mentorship over the past seven years has helped me to 
become a better critical thinker, researcher, and writer. I look forward to future collaborations 
with you and a continued friendship. I would also like to thank my dissertation committee, Drs. 
Jill Rich and Raymond Mar, for their helpful feedback and support. Finally, I am grateful to Drs. 
Asaf Gilboa, Rosanna Olsen, and Donald Stuss for their valuable comments, discussions, and 
advice.   
I am thankful for the support I received from the Cognitive Neuroscience Lab. Everyone 
in the lab has been an invaluable part of my educational experience. I especially want to thank 
Donna and Nicole for the many good times we shared over the past few years. 
Thank you to my family and friends for their enormous support, especially my mom, dad, 
Rachel, Michelle, and Daniel. Finally, I wish to express sincere thanks to Jesse for being the 
most supportive, generous, and patient husband. I am lucky to have you. 
   
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................ iv 
List of Tables .............................................................................................................................. viii 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Appendices ......................................................................................................................... x 
CHAPTER 1 .................................................................................................................................. 1 
General Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 
The Flexible Nature of AM......................................................................................................... 2 
Theory of Mind ........................................................................................................................... 3 
Neural Basis of ToM ................................................................................................................... 5 
How is ToM Achieved? .............................................................................................................. 7 
Reliance on AM ....................................................................................................................... 7 
Reliance on Semantic Memory................................................................................................ 9 
Interaction Between AM and Semantic Memory .................................................................... 9 
Relationship Between AM and ToM ........................................................................................ 11 
Developmental Trajectory of AM and ToM .......................................................................... 11 
Overlap in the Functional Neuroanatomy of Autobiographical Memory, Theory of Mind, 
and the Default Mode Network ............................................................................................. 12 
Dissociations Between AM and ToM in Neuroimaging Studies ........................................... 14 
Comorbid Impairment of AM and ToM in Clinical Populations .......................................... 15 
Dissociations Between AM and ToM in Clinical Populations .............................................. 15 
Overview of Experiments ......................................................................................................... 16 
CHAPTER 2 ................................................................................................................................ 19 
Experiment 1: Theory of Mind Development Can Withstand Compromised 
Autobiographical Episodic Memory Development .................................................................. 19 
Method ...................................................................................................................................... 20 
Participants ........................................................................................................................... 20 
Materials and Procedure ...................................................................................................... 23 
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 25 
Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 27 
CHAPTER 3 ................................................................................................................................ 32 
Experiment 2: Familiarity Modulates the Functional Relationship Between Theory of Mind 
and Autobiographical Memory ................................................................................................. 32 
Method ...................................................................................................................................... 34 
vi 
 
Participants ........................................................................................................................... 34 
Stimuli ................................................................................................................................... 35 
Task ....................................................................................................................................... 36 
Postscan Interview ................................................................................................................ 38 
Data Acquisition ................................................................................................................... 39 
Data Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 40 
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 42 
Participants’ Presence in the AM Photos ............................................................................. 42 
Phenomenology of the AM, pToM, and ToM Events ............................................................ 43 
Postscan Interview ................................................................................................................ 44 
fMRI Results .......................................................................................................................... 45 
Common regions involved in AM, pToM, and ToM.......................................................... 45 
AM and pToM versus ToM. ............................................................................................. 48 
pToM versus ToM. ........................................................................................................... 55 
Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 59 
Neural Overlap Between AM and pToM Versus ToM .......................................................... 59 
Differences Between pToM Versus ToM ............................................................................... 62 
Differences Between AM Versus pToM ................................................................................ 63 
Theoretical Implications ....................................................................................................... 65 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 67 
CHAPTER 4 ................................................................................................................................ 68 
Experiment 3: Imagining Other People’s Experiences in a Person With Impaired 
Autobiographical Episodic Memory: The Role of Personal Familiarity ............................... 68 
Method ...................................................................................................................................... 69 
Participants ........................................................................................................................... 69 
Stimuli ................................................................................................................................... 69 
Adapted Autobiographical Interview Scoring Procedure..................................................... 70 
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 72 
Phenomenology of the pToM, ToM, and AM Events ............................................................ 73 
Adapted Autobiographical Interview Results ....................................................................... 74 
Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 78 
CHAPTER 5 ................................................................................................................................ 85 
Experiment 4: Activation of Hippocampal Tissue in Developmental Amnesia During 
Remembering and Imagining .................................................................................................... 85 
Method ...................................................................................................................................... 88 
vii 
 
Participants ........................................................................................................................... 88 
Task ....................................................................................................................................... 88 
Postscan Interview ................................................................................................................ 89 
Data Acquisition and Preprocessing .................................................................................... 90 
Data Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 91 
Percent signal change. ....................................................................................................... 92 
fMRI analyses within H.C. ............................................................................................... 93 
Functional connectivity analyses. ..................................................................................... 94 
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 94 
Phenomenology of the AM, pToM, and ToM Events ............................................................ 94 
Percent Signal Change ......................................................................................................... 96 
AM. ................................................................................................................................... 96 
pToM................................................................................................................................. 96 
ToM................................................................................................................................... 97 
fMRI Analyses Within in H.C. ............................................................................................. 100 
Functional Connectivity Between the PCC and ROIs ........................................................ 100 
AM. ................................................................................................................................. 101 
pToM............................................................................................................................... 101 
ToM................................................................................................................................. 101 
Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 104 
Hippocampal Activation ..................................................................................................... 104 
Extrahippocampal Activations ............................................................................................ 107 
Functional Connectivity ...................................................................................................... 108 
CHAPTER 6 .............................................................................................................................. 110 
General Discussion .................................................................................................................... 110 
Summary of the Experiments.................................................................................................. 110 
The Role of the Common Core Network and the Hippocampus ............................................ 112 
How is ToM Achieved? .......................................................................................................... 115 
Clinical Implications ............................................................................................................... 117 
Future Directions .................................................................................................................... 118 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 120 
References .................................................................................................................................. 122 
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 2.1. H.C.’s Performance on Standardized Tests of Autobiographical Episodic 
Memory……………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
22 
 
Table 2.2. H.C. and Controls’ Performance on Theory of Mind Tests …………………….. 
 
26 
 
Table 3.1. Coordinates of Regions Associated with AM, pToM, and ToM Versus Two 
Control Conditions………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
47 
 
Table 3.2. Coordinates of Regions Associated with AM and pToM Versus ToM (LV 1)…. 
 
50 
 
Table 3.3. Coordinates of Regions Associated with AM Versus pToM (LV 2)……………. 
 
54 
 
Table 3.4. Coordinates of Regions Associated with pToM Versus ToM…………………… 
 
57 
 
Table 4.1. Classification of Descriptive Versus Elaborative Details for the 
Autobiographical Interview ………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
71 
 
Table 4.2. Phenomenological Qualities of the Generated pToM, ToM, and AM Events…... 
 
74 
 
Table 5.1. Phenomenological Qualities of the AM, pToM, and ToM Events………………. 
 
Table 5.2 The Mean Correlation Coefficients Between the PCC and Other Brain Regions 
Within the Common Core Network for AM, pToM, and ToM…………………………… 
 
 
95 
 
 
103 
  
  
  
ix 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 2.1: Selected Coronal Slices of an MRI Scan in H.C. (left) and an Age- and Sex-
Matched Healthy Control Participant (right)………………………………………………... 
 
21 
 
Figure 3.1. An Example of the Stimuli Used in the Family Photos Task…………………... 
 
36 
 
Figure 3.2: Common Pattern of Activity During AM, pToM, and ToM Versus Two 
Control Conditions (Latent Variable 1, p < .0001).…...…………………………………….. 
 
 
46 
 
Figure 3.3: Differential Activity during AM and pToM, Versus ToM (Latent Variable 1, p 
< .005………………………………………………...……………………………………… 
 
 
49 
 
Figure 3.4: Differential Activity during AM Versus pToM (Latent Variable 2, p < 
.05)…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
53 
 
Figure 3.5: Differential Activity during pToM Versus ToM (Latent Variable 1, p < 
.0001)………….……..………………………………………………………….………….. 
 
 
56 
 
Figure 4.1. The Mean Number of Elaborative Details Generated in Response to Each 
pToM, ToM, and AM Event…………………………………………….………………….. 
 
 
75 
 
Figure 4.2. The Mean Proportion of Elaborative-to-Total-Internal Details Generated in 
Response to Each pToM, ToM, and AM Event…………………………….………………. 
 
 
76 
 
Figure 4.3. Representative Samples of the pToM, ToM, and AM Narratives Provided by 
H.C. and a Control Participant…...............………………………………….……………… 
 
 
77 
 
Figure 5.1. Coronal slices Showing Hippocampal Activation in H.C. in Response to the 
(A) AM (B) pToM, and C) ToM Events…………………………………………………… 
 
 
98 
 
Figure 5.2. The Bar Graphs Depict the Mean Percent Signal Change in H.C. and Controls 
for the (A) AM (B) pToM, and C) ToM Events……………………………………………. 
 
 
99 
 
Figure 5.3. Differential fMRI activity in H.C. ………………………………………………  
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
List of Appendices 
 
Appendix A.  
 
Figure A.1: Narrative Sample from Levine et al. (2002) Illustrating the Autobiographical 
Interview Scoring Procedure.…………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
 
138 
 
Appendix B.  
 
Table B.1: Neuropsychological Profile of H.C…………………………………………… 
 
 
139 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
General Introduction 
 
Autobiographical episodic memory (AM) refers to the ability to recall past personally 
experienced events. It is well established that structures within the medial temporal lobe (MTL), 
particularly the hippocampus, are critical for recollecting AMs (Addis et al., 2004; Cabeza & St. 
Jacques, 2007; Conway & Fthenaki, 2000; Moscovitch et al., 2005; Moscovitch, Nadel, 
Winocur, Gilboa, & Rosenbaum, 2006). As such, damage to the hippocampus typically results in 
an amnestic syndrome, the hallmark of which is the inability to recall past autobiographical 
experiences (Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, & Mishkin, 2001; Rosenbaum et al., 2005, 2008). 
However, there is growing evidence that other, non-mnemonic processes may be compromised 
in amnesia as well. The majority of this work has focused on the idea that AM is necessary for 
imagining future events (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Andelman, Hoofien, Goldberg, 
Aizenstein, & Neufeld, 2010; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Kwan, Carson, Addis, & 
Rosenbaum, 2010; Tulving, 1985), whereas much less consideration has been given to the role 
AM plays in social behaviour. Therefore, the purpose of the present dissertation was to address 
this gap in the literature and to examine if and under what conditions AM contributes to ToM, 
including the ability to imagine other people’s experiences. Specifically, I address two main 
research questions in this dissertation:  
1. Are AM difficulties caused by early-onset hippocampal damage associated with 
impaired performance on standard measures of ToM (Experiment 1)? 
2.  Is AM and the brain regions that support it involved to a greater extent in imagining 
the experiences of personally known others compared to unknown others (Experiments 2, 
3, and 4)?  
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Before describing these experiments in more detail, I review the literature on AM and 
ToM. I begin by discussing the flexible nature of AM and how this flexibility may benefit non-
mnemonic processes, such as ToM. This is followed by a brief review of the ToM literature. 
Next, I review several theories that have been proposed regarding how individuals infer other 
people’s mental states during ToM. Here I introduce the main hypothesis tested in the current 
study – that individuals might rely on their own past experiences in order to understand and 
predict the thoughts and feelings of other people. Finally, I discuss several lines of research 
showing that a close relationship exists between AM and ToM. To do so, I bring together 
developmental, neuroimaging, and clinical findings. 
The Flexible Nature of AM 
 
Much research has shown that AM is not a literal reproduction of the past, but rather a 
reconstructive process in which bits of information from various sources are bound together via 
the hippocampus (Bartlett, 1932; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Schacter et al., 2012). 
Because memories are not tightly bound units, elements constituting a memory can be 
manipulated and recombined in novel ways, making AM flexible and adaptive (Moscovitch, 
2008; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008). Several researchers have 
suggested that this flexible property of the AM system may provide the building blocks to 
support other, non-mnemonic cognitive processes (Addis et al., 2007; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; 
Moscovitch, 2008; Schacter & Addis, 2007).  
Several investigators have argued that AM may be critical for simulating and imagining 
oneself in possible future episodes (Addis et al., 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007). Evidence 
supporting this idea comes from neuroimaging studies showing that imagining the future engages 
a similar set of brain regions as those that support AM, including the hippocampus (Addis et al., 
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2007; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007). 
Consistent with this finding, amnesic individuals with hippocampal damage who are unable to 
recollect past events also have difficulty imagining themselves in future events (Andelman et al., 
2010; Klein et al., 2002; Kwan et al., 2010; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011; Tulving, 1985). 
Other work has shown that imagination impairments in adult-onset amnesic individuals are not 
restricted to the future, but also extend to imagining novel scenes that do not require “mental 
time travel” per se (e.g., “Imagine you’re lying on a white sandy beach in a beautiful tropical 
bay;” Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; 
Maguire & Hassabis, 2011). These findings suggest that AM is not only critical for imagining 
the past and future but may play a broader role in imagining detailed scenarios. Extending from 
this idea, AM and its underlying properties (e.g., retrieval of details, relational processes, 
metacognitive reflection) may benefit other nontemporal, cognitive processes, such as imagining 
other people’s mental states and experiences during ToM. 
Theory of Mind 
 
The term theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to infer other people’s thoughts, 
feelings, beliefs, desires, and intentions. Having a ToM is essential for successful social 
interaction; it facilitates the capacity to communicate, cooperate, and empathize with others 
(Amodio & Frith, 2006; Baron-Cohen, 1999). It has also been suggested to be at the heart of 
understanding fiction and relating to characters in a story (Mar & Oatley, 2008). ToM is used 
spontaneously and effortlessly in everyday life. For example, when giving a presentation, the 
speaker might start to wonder whether the audience members are intently interested or just barely 
staying awake and hoping the presentation ends soon. Similarly, in competitive games, one 
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presumably attempts to infer the mental state of a competitor in order to predict his/her next 
move, such as in a game of chess or poker.  
Over the last several decades researchers have developed numerous measures to assess 
ToM abilities in the laboratory. These ToM tests vary in the degree of cognitive versus affective 
content, in the use of narratives versus cartoons, and the type of cue used (e.g., multimodal, static 
vs. dynamic). One of the most commonly used ToM tests is the False Belief test. This test was 
originally created for use with children who develop ToM around the age 4 or 5 (Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001). This test requires participants to understand that other people can hold a 
false belief that is different from their own correct knowledge (Dennett, 1978; see also Stone, 
Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998). An example of a False Belief test item from Wimmer and Perner 
(1983) is as follows:  
Max eats half his chocolate bar and puts the rest away in the kitchen cupboard. He 
then goes out to play in the sun. Meanwhile, Max’s mother comes into the 
kitchen, opens the cupboard and sees the chocolate bar. She puts it in the fridge. 
When Max comes back into the kitchen, where does he look for his chocolate bar: 
in the cupboard, or in the fridge? 
To correctly answer this question one must infer that Max thinks that the chocolate is still 
in the cupboard (and ignore the true state of affairs, that is, that the chocolate is actually in the 
fridge). A more advanced test of ToM is the Faux Pas test, which requires participants to 
recognize that someone said something that should not have been said as a result of not knowing 
certain information. To know that a faux pas has occurred, one must integrate a false belief 
representation with a feeling of empathy (Stone et al., 1998). Another commonly used test is the 
Animations test, which assesses participants’ ability to represent complex intentions based on the 
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interaction of moving pairs of triangles (Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; Castelli, Happé, 
Frith, & Frith, 2000; Heider & Simmel, 1944). A final example of a commonly used ToM task is 
the Mind-in-the-Eyes test. In this task, participants view a series of photographs depicting the eye 
region of faces and select the mental state or emotion that best captures the expression in the 
eyes (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). One criticism of most ToM tests 
is that they employ highly-controlled and artificial stimuli and therefore may not capture ToM as 
it occurs in everyday life (Spreng & Mar, 2012; Zaki & Ochsner, 2009, 2012). Unlike the 
laboratory tests described above, real life typically provides access to multimodal cues (e.g., 
visual, semantic, and prosodic information) and people infer the mental states of others they 
know quite well, such as family members, friends, and co-workers. Furthermore, standard ToM 
tasks typically involve momentary scenarios, yet in real life mental state inferences do not occur 
in isolation but rather are dynamic and involve the integration of information over time. In light 
of these concerns, an important goal for research in this area is to develop more ecologically 
valid measures of ToM. 
Neural Basis of ToM 
 
With the availability of neuroimaging techniques and lesion-based approaches, a growing 
body of research has focused on identifying the brain regions that support ToM. Neuroimaging 
studies show that a distributed set of brain regions supports ToM, including the medial prefrontal 
cortex (PFC), ventrolateral PFC, temporal poles, superior temporal sulcus, medial parietal cortex, 
temporal-parietal junction (TPJ), amygdala, and MTL regions (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Mar, 
2011; Olson, Plotzker, & Ezzyat, 2007; Rabin, Gilboa, Stuss, Mar, & Rosenbaum, 2010; Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009; Van Overwalle, 2009). 
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Importantly, these findings do not suggest that all of these areas are necessary for ToM, only that 
they are consistently activated across studies examining ToM. 
Work with brain-damaged patients has also helped to identify the brain regions that 
support ToM. The majority of this research has focused on only a few regions, namely the 
medial PFC, temporal poles, and TPJ. With respect to the medial PFC, studies examining 
patients with damage to this area consistently show impairments across a number of different 
ToM and perspective-taking tasks (Lee et al., 2010; Rowe, Bullock, Polkey, & Morris, 2001; 
Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, & Aharon-Peretz, 2003; Stuss, Gallup, & Alexander, 2001; cf. 
Bird et al., 2004). For example, patients with damage to the frontal lobes exhibit deficits on the 
Faux Pas task (Lee et al., 2010) as well as on tasks that require deception and visual perspective 
taking (Stuss et al., 2001), among others. In contrast, patients with lesions to either the TPJ or 
temporal poles have produced mixed findings, with some studies showing impaired ToM 
abilities (Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004; Duval et al., 2012; Irish, Hodges, 
& Piguet, 2014; Samson, Apperly, & Humphreys, 2007) and others showing intact ToM 
performance (Channon et al., 2007; Michel et al., 2013; Shamay-Tsoory, Tibi-Elhanany, & 
Aharon-Peretz, 2006 ). Additional patient research is needed to help clarify whether the regions 
activated in neuroimaging studies are critical for the expression of ToM. Extant work has 
focused on better characterizing the role of the medial PFC, TPJ, and temporal poles; in contrast, 
little research has been dedicated to understanding the role of the hippocampus in ToM abilities 
(Rosenbaum, Stuss, Levine, & Tulving, 2007). Therefore, it remains unknown whether the 
hippocampus is necessary for ToM. 
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How is ToM Achieved? 
 
Although humans regularly engage in ToM, the mechanism supporting this ability 
continues to be debated. In this section I discuss several theories that have been proposed 
regarding how individuals infer other people’s invisible mental states. I begin by discussing the 
idea that individuals might rely on AM in order to understand and predict what other people are 
thinking and feeling. I then introduce the idea that ToM may also depend on semantic memory 
(memory for facts and general knowledge about the world) or an interaction of AM and semantic 
memory.  
Reliance on AM 
 
The idea that individuals rely on past personal experiences to infer and understand other 
people’s mental states has been argued by philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive 
neuroscientists alike (e.g., Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Eklund, Andersson-Stråberg, & Hansen, 
2009; Hume, 1957; Kohut, 1984). Individuals may understand how others feel because they 
recall having experienced similar episodes in their own lives and how they felt at that time. For 
example, one study showed that participants reported more empathy for women who experienced 
a similar upsetting life event compared to women who had not experienced a similar event 
(Batson et al., 1996). In another study, participants were asked to read two stories: one story 
involved a character who experienced love-related failures and the other involved a character 
who experienced work-related failures. In a subsequent faux pas recognition task, participants 
reported more empathy for the character unlucky in love in love-related faux pas scenarios, and 
more empathy for the character unlucky at work in work-related faux pas scenarios. These 
results suggest that recollecting previous episodes involving the protagonist enabled the 
participant to better understand how the character felt in various situations (Ciaramelli, Bernardi, 
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& Moscovitch, 2013; for similar results see Eklund et al., 2009). In a similar vein, a recent fMRI 
study reported increased hippocampal activity when participants made judgments of similar 
others’ emotional states (e.g., How would Joe feel about losing his wallet?), but only when 
participants had a personal memory of the event that the similar other experienced (Perry et al., 
2011). These studies suggest that relying on past episodes may be an important antecedent for 
understanding another person’s experience. It may be the case that individuals replay specific 
past experiences or recombine details from stored memories to help them imagine and infer what 
another person might be thinking and/or feeling (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter et al., 2008; 
Schacter & Addis, 2007). 
Some of these ideas are captured in Simulation Theory, which was proposed nearly three 
decades ago (Gordon, 1986; Goldman, 1992). This theory posits that individuals use their own 
mental processes as a model to understand and predict the thoughts and feelings of other people.  
This type of perspective-taking is akin to “putting oneself in another person’s shoes.” A recent 
series of papers suggested that individuals may preferentially rely on this strategy when making 
mental state inferences of others deemed similar to the self compared to others deemed dissimilar 
to the self (Mitchell, 2009; Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005; Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; 
cf. Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010). This theory was based on results that showed a double 
dissociation between thinking about similar versus dissimilar others, such that the former 
engaged a region of ventral medial PFC, a region linked to self-referential thought and AM, 
whereas the latter engaged a more dorsal subregion of the medial PFC. These results suggest that 
different ToM strategies may be employed depending on who the target person is. Taken 
together, the studies reviewed here demonstrate that access to past experiences may help to 
understand other people’s mental states and experiences. 
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Reliance on Semantic Memory 
 
Another possibility is that ToM may be achieved by relying on semantic memory, which 
refers to one’s general knowledge and information about the world (Binder & Desai, 2011). 
Social semantic information, such as scripts and schemas, may help to interpret and predict other 
people’s behaviour in particular situations (Gallagher & Frith, 2003). For example, to correctly 
identify whether something hurtful was said in the Faux Pas test, participants likely rely on their 
knowledge of social etiquette rather than on specific instances of such occurrences in their own 
lives. This interpretation is supported by recent fMRI findings that show greater activity within 
lateral frontal and temporal regions, regions associated with semantic memory, during ToM 
when it is directly compared to AM (Rabin et al., 2010; Spreng & Grady, 2010; St. Jacques, 
Conway, Lowder, & Cabeza 2011). Further evidence supporting the importance of semantic 
memory to ToM comes from studies of patients with semantic dementia, which results in a 
profound loss of semantic knowledge in the context of relatively preserved AM. Duval and 
colleagues (2012) found that this patient group performed significantly worse than control 
participants on a wide range of ToM tests (cf. Michel et al., 2013), thereby leading the authors to 
conclude that semantic memory contributes importantly to ToM. 
Interaction Between AM and Semantic Memory 
 
It is also possible that individuals do not simply rely on one strategy to infer another 
person’s mental state, but rather ToM is achieved through various routes. For example, there 
may be some interplay between AM and semantic memory, such that in some instances AM is 
the preferred strategy, whereas in other situations semantic memory is the preferred strategy. 
These strategies are not viewed as mutually exclusive, and individuals likely draw on both types 
of memories to varying degrees to infer and imagine other people’s mental states and 
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experiences. The extent to which each memory system is recruited during ToM likely depends 
on a number of factors including accessibility to AM and semantic memory, one’s current goals, 
the information/cues available, and who the target person is. This idea is an extension of the 
transformation hypothesis, which suggests that there is a dynamic relationship between AM 
supported by the hippocampus and semanticized versions of the original memory supported by 
the neocortex (Winocur & Moscovitch, 2011; Winocur, Moscovitch, & Bontempi, 2010; see also 
Moscovitch et al., 2005, 2006; Rosenbaum, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2001; Spreng & Mar, 
2012). These semantic memories are thought to result from AMs undergoing a transformation 
process, which leads to the emergence of schematic memories that can be accessed 
independently of the hippocampus. Building on these ideas, Spreng and Mar (2012) proposed 
that personal and interpersonal information may be integrated for the strategic use of social 
conceptual knowledge, which in turn informs one’s behaviour. This may include the generation 
of personality models that can be used to imagine and predict other people’s thoughts and 
feelings (Hassabis et al., 2013). 
The idea that AM and semantic memory interact is consistent with recent empirical 
studies of the default mode network (DMN) – an intrinsically organized set of brain regions that 
is active during rest (Raichle et al., 2001) and is known to overlap with the brain regions that 
support AM and ToM (Spreng et al., 2009). Recent reports suggest that the DMN can be 
fractionated into at least two distinct yet interacting subsystems: a medial temporal subsystem 
and a dorsal medial subsystem, both of which converge on midline regions (Andrews-Hanna, 
Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010). The medial temporal subsystem consists of the 
hippocampus, parahippocampal cortex, retrosplenial cortex, posterior inferior parietal lobe, and 
the ventromedial PFC, whereas the dorsal medial subsystem comprises the dorsal medial PFC, 
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TPJ, lateral temporal cortex, and temporal poles (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Andrews-Hanna, 
Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014). Notably, the MTL subsystem closely resembles the regions that 
support AM, whereas the dorsal medial network closely resembles the regions that support 
semantic memory. Thus, these interacting subsystems may be responsible for retrieving and 
combining information stored in autobiographical and semantic memory in order to infer other 
people’s thoughts and feelings.  
Although there may be several additional routes to ToM (e.g., mirror neurons), the 
current dissertation focuses primarily on the idea that AM may be beneficial, or even necessary, 
for the expression of ToM abilities, at least under some circumstances. In the next section, I 
highlight several lines of research supporting the idea that AM and ToM are closely related. 
Relationship Between AM and ToM 
 
A close relationship between AM and ToM has been suggested by several observations: 
(a) AM and ToM emerge close in time in normal child development (Perner & Ruffman, 1995), 
(b) both abilities rely on a similar set of brain regions (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis & 
Maguire, 2007; Rabin et al., 2010; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Spreng et al., 2009), and (c) several 
patient populations with ToM impairment also show deficits in AM (Adler, Nadler, Eviatar, & 
Shamay-Tsoory, 2010; Corcoran & Frith, 2003; Dimaggio, Salvatore, Popolo, & Lysaker, 2012).  
Developmental Trajectory of AM and ToM  
  
AM and ToM emerge close in time in ontogenetic development. Developmental studies 
of healthy children show that ToM improves with the development of AM (Naito, 2003; Perner, 
Kloo, & Gornik, 2007; Perner & Ruffman, 1995). For example, Perner and colleagues (2007) 
examined children between the ages of 3 and 5, and found a correlation between improvement on 
free recall and performance on several ToM tests. Their results were largely consistent with 
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those reported by Naito (2003) who studied a sample of Japanese children using different 
measures of memory recall and ToM. However, these studies included laboratory-based tasks to 
assess memory abilities (i.e., list-learning and recall) rather than tasks that require participants to 
recall past personal episodes. This is important to note given that these two types of memory 
tasks have been shown to rely on different brain regions (Gilboa, 2004; McDermott, Szpunar, & 
Christ, 2009).  
Additional evidence supporting a developmental connection between AM and ToM 
comes from a study with adults diagnosed with developmental disorders such as high functioning 
Autism and Asperger’s syndrome (Adler et al., 2010). This study found that ToM abilities could 
be predicted by performance on a test of AM in both patient groups, suggesting that difficulties 
in AM are closely related to impairments in ToM. It should be noted, however, that language and 
executive demands were not taken into account in that study. 
Studies showing that AM and ToM develop in tandem have informed theories of child 
development. These theories propose that the ability to recall past personal experiences may be 
critical for the development of ToM (Fivush & Nelson, 2006; Nelson, 2009; Robinson & 
Swanson, 1990). Several researchers argue that insight into one’s own mental experiences gained 
through the development of AM might enable the child to appreciate others’ mental states 
(Robinson & Swanson, 1990) or to realize that others can have a unique perspective on a shared 
experience (Fivush & Nelson, 2006).  
Overlap in the Functional Neuroanatomy of Autobiographical Memory, Theory of Mind, and the 
Default Mode Network 
 
Several qualitative reviews have noted that the brain regions underlying AM are 
strikingly similar to those that underpin a host of other abilities including ToM, future thinking, 
and some forms of spatial navigation (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). 
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This network of brain regions includes the medial PFC, medial and lateral parietal cortex, and 
regions within the MTL. There is also evidence of neural overlap between these domains and 
that of the DMN (Buckner & Carroll, 2007). Of note, a quantitative meta-analysis of 
neuroimaging studies of AM, ToM, future thinking, navigation, and the default mode showed 
that AM and ToM displayed the greatest degree of neural overlap of all the abilities examined 
(Spreng et al., 2009). 
To further explore the functional and neural relationship between AM and ToM, Rabin 
and colleagues compared these two abilities within the same individuals using closely matched 
conditions (Rabin et al., 2010). This was an important step given that previous evidence of a 
shared brain network underlying AM and ToM was based on comparisons of independent 
neuroimaging studies investigating one ability or the other. In that study, a family photos task 
was employed (Gilboa, Winocur, Grady, Hevenor, & Moscovitch, 2004), in which participants 
recollected past events in response to personal photos (AM condition) and imagined other 
people’s experiences in response to photos of unfamiliar people (ToM condition). AM and ToM 
were compared to a low-level baseline (i.e., scrambled photos) and directly to each other to 
systematically examine areas common to both abilities as well as areas of unique activity, 
respectively. A conjunction analysis confirmed that AM and ToM are supported by a common 
set of brain regions that includes medial PFC, MTL regions, lateral temporal cortex, and medial 
parietal cortex. Similar findings were reported in another study that directly compared AM and 
ToM using the International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) as cues 
(Spreng & Grady, 2010).  
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Dissociations Between AM and ToM in Neuroimaging Studies 
 
As mentioned above, a number of studies have shown that AM and ToM are supported 
by a common core network. However, there is also neuroimaging evidence showing 
dissociations between the two abilities. For example, Rabin and colleagues (2010) directly 
compared AM and ToM within the same individuals and found greater activity within midline 
regions, such as medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus, during AM and 
greater activity within more lateral frontal and temporal regions during ToM. When AM and 
ToM were separated into construction (i.e., initial search of event details) and elaboration 
(expanding on event details) phases, activity within the right hippocampus was associated with 
AM construction, whereas activity within the right TPJ was associated with ToM elaboration. In 
a similar vein, Spreng and Grady (2010) showed that autobiographical remembering (and 
prospection) engaged midline structures to a greater degree, whereas ToM engaged more lateral 
areas. Further evidence for a neural dissociation between AM and ToM comes from another 
fMRI study that also employed naturalistic stimuli as cues. In that study, AM recruited ventral 
medial PFC, whereas thinking about another person’s perspective recruited a more dorsal region 
of the medial PFC (St. Jacques et al., 2011). Furthermore, these two regions were connected to 
separate neural networks. Specifically, the ventral medial PFC showed greater functional 
connectivity with the hippocampus and precuneus – a pattern consistent with the network of 
regions known to support AM, whereas the dorsal medial PFC exhibited greater connectivity 
with frontal and parietal regions, a set of regions that has been linked to controlled processes 
(Andrews-Hanna, Saxe, & Yarkoni, 2014; St. Jacques et al., 2011).  
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Comorbid Impairment of AM and ToM in Clinical Populations 
 
 Evidence from the developmental literature and neuroimaging studies suggest an intimate 
relationship between remembering the past and ToM. There are also data suggesting that the two 
abilities are linked in certain psychopathologies. For example, several researchers have found 
that both AM and ToM are impoverished in people with schizophrenia (Corcoran & Frith, 2003; 
Dimaggio et al., 2012), in individuals with personality disorders (Dimaggio et al., 2012), and in 
people with high functioning Autism and Asperger’s syndrome, as mentioned above (Adler et 
al., 2010). ToM deficits have also been observed in individuals with mesial temporal lobe 
epilepsy, a chronic neurological disorder that typically results in compromised AM abilities 
(Giovagnoli, Reati, & Parente, 2011; Li et al., 2013; Schacher et al., 2006). In contrast to these 
findings, there is some patient work showing dissociations between AM and ToM (see below; 
Rosenbaum et al., 2007). 
Dissociations Between AM and ToM in Clinical Populations 
 
There are some clinical populations who demonstrate impaired AM with intact ToM. For 
example, two amnesic individuals with severely impaired AM due to hippocampal damage (K.C. 
and M.L.) performed at the same level as controls on a large number of objective ToM tests 
(Rosenbaum et al., 2007). The ToM tests employed in that study were the same tests shown to 
activate the common set of regions revealed in the reviews of the neuroimaging literature 
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Spreng et al., 2009). These tests included predicting a character's false 
belief about the location of an object (False Belief test; Stone et al., 1998), deciphering others’ 
thoughts and emotions based only on the eye region of their faces (The Mind-in-the-Eyes test; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), and identifying whether a character unintentionally said something 
hurtful to a second character as a result of not knowing certain information (Faux Pas test; Stone 
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et al., 1998). Findings of intact ToM in amnesic people with impaired AM suggest that access to 
past experiences may not be necessary to perform well on standard tests of ToM. It may be that 
when AM is compromised, ToM can be achieved via access to social semantic knowledge, as 
described above. It is important to note that the standard ToM tasks used by Rosenbaum and 
colleagues included strangers and fictional characters as the target of the mental state inference. 
Semantic memory (and not AM) may be sufficient to perform these types of inferences; 
however, it remains unknown whether AM abilities are more essential to ToM when personally 
known others are the subject of the mental state inference. 
 In the current dissertation, I explored the idea that AM makes an important, and at times 
necessary, contribution to ToM when the mental state inference involves personally known 
others (e.g., family members, close friends) versus unknown others. Indeed, knowing someone 
for a long period of time and observing that person’s behaviour in many different situations 
provides a rich source of information from which one can draw when imagining that person’s 
mental state in specific situations. For example, remembering how your best friend behaved 
during last year’s Super Bowl party would likely help you predict how he or she might behave 
during this year’s party. There is some evidence supporting this idea. For example, one study 
found that participants reported that they relied on a specific memory or anecdote significantly 
more often when making judgments relating to close friends compared to strangers (Krienen et 
al., 2010).  
Overview of Experiments 
 
 The above review suggests that AM and ToM are closely related. In addition to a shared 
neural substrate that appears to include the hippocampus, the two abilities emerge close in time 
in ontogenetic development, and both abilities tend to be impaired in various psychopathologies. 
17 
 
However, at odds with these findings are observations that (a) individuals with adult-onset 
hippocampal amnesia show preserved performance on standard tests of ToM, and (b) 
neuroimaging studies demonstrate that the brain regions that support AM and ToM are not 
identical (Rabin et al., 2010; Spreng & Grady, 2010; St. Jacques et al., 2011). In the current 
dissertation, I closely examined the functional and neural relationship between AM and ToM in 
order to reconcile these discrepant findings. Experiment 1 sought to determine whether AM is 
necessary for the development of ToM. It is possible that once ToM is fully developed, it no 
longer depends on AM or the hippocampus. If this is the case, it would explain why the adult-
onset amnesic patients, K.C. and M.L., show intact ToM performance in the study by 
Rosenbaum and colleagues (2007). To investigate this hypothesis, a wide range of standard ToM 
tests was administered to H.C., a young woman with impaired AM development as a result of 
early-onset hippocampal damage (Hurley, Maguire, & Vargha-Khadem, 2011; Kwan et al., 
2010; Rosenbaum et al., 2011; Vargha-Khadem et al., 2003). 
 Another possible explanation for K.C.’s and M.L.’s intact ToM performance is that 
semantic memory may be sufficient to perform well on standard ToM tasks that employ 
strangers or fictional characters as targets (Rosenbaum et al., 2007). However, it remains 
unknown whether AM benefits, or is possibly necessary, for ToM involving personally known 
others. To investigate this possibility, Experiments 2, 3, and 4 examined whether AM is more 
beneficial for imagining the experiences of personally known others (pToM) than for unknown 
others (ToM). More specifically, using an adapted version of the family photos task (Rabin et al., 
2010), Experiment 2 examined whether different cognitive and neural mechanisms support 
pToM and ToM in healthy control participants. To foreshadow the results, I found greater neural 
overlap between AM and pToM compared to pToM and ToM. Notably, the greatest amount of 
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neural overlap between AM and pToM was observed within midline regions, including the 
hippocampus. To further explore these findings, Experiment 3 and 4 tested whether AM 
supported by the hippocampus is necessary for pToM. To do so, I tested H.C. on the same family 
photos paradigm employed in Experiment 2. H.C.’s behavioural results are reported in 
Experiment 3, and her neuroimaging findings are reported in Experiment 4. The latter 
experiment provided the opportunity to examine the neural basis of impaired and spared aspects 
of ToM in a person with impaired AM and early hippocampal damage. In summary, the series of 
experiments presented in this dissertation investigated if, and under what conditions, AM, 
supported by the hippocampus, is important for imagining other people’s mental states and 
experiences, aspects that comprise ToM.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Experiment 1: Theory of Mind Development Can Withstand Compromised 
Autobiographical Episodic Memory Development 
 
As discussed above, neuroimaging findings demonstrate that a common set of brain 
regions support AM and ToM, including the hippocampus and related MTL regions (Rabin et al., 
2010; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Spreng et al., 2009). These findings are in line with developmental 
theories that propose that the ability to recall past personal experiences may be critical for the 
development of ToM (Fivush & Nelson, 2006; Nelson, 2009; Robinson & Swanson, 1990). For 
example, several researchers argue that insight into one’s own mental experiences gained 
through the development of AM might enable the child to appreciate others’ mental states 
(Robinson & Swanson, 1990) or to realize that others can have a unique perspective on a shared 
experience (Fivush & Nelson, 2006).  
Contrary to suggestions from the neuroimaging and developmental literature, individuals 
with adult-onset hippocampal damage and severely impaired AM can perform well on a battery 
of standard ToM tests (Rosenbaum et al., 2007). However, these adult-onset cases experienced 
normal AM development, which may be critical for ToM to develop (Fivush & Nelson, 2006; 
Nelson, 2009; Robinson & Swanson, 1990). It is possible that once developed, ToM no longer 
depends on AM and can be achieved via alternate strategies and neural substrates, such as social 
semantic memory, which remains relatively intact in amnesia. However, the causal nature of this 
relationship has not been tested empirically. This is surprising given the implications for 
understanding how ToM develops and why ToM is vulnerable in a host of developmental, 
psychiatric, and neurological disorders. 
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In Experiment 1, I examined whether normal AM development is necessary for the 
normal development of ToM. To investigate this, I tested H.C on a wide range of objective ToM 
tests. As mentioned earlier, H.C. is a young woman with normal intellectual function despite 
never having developed normal autobiographical episodic memory as a result of damage to the 
extended hippocampal system believed to have occurred during fetal development (Olsen et al., 
2013; Rosenbaum et al., 2011, in preparation; Vargha-Khadem et al., 2003). In the current study, 
a sample of widely used tests of ToM were selected that (a) varied in the degree of cognitive 
versus affective content, use of narratives, and type of cue used; (b) are known to activate the set 
of brain regions that support AM (Spreng et al., 2009); and (c) are sensitive to ToM impairment 
in a variety of patient groups (Gregory et al., 2002; Stone et al., 1998; Stone, Baron-Cohen, 
Calder, Keane, & Young, 2003; Stuss, Gallup, & Alexander, 2001). Findings of intact ToM in 
H.C. would provide compelling evidence that the development of AM is not necessary for ToM 
to emerge, and that non-mnemonic strategies are sufficient for successful performance on 
standard ToM tasks. This study will also help to inform theories of cognitive development and 
the resilience of brain function to early disruption. 
Method 
Participants 
 
H.C. is a right-handed woman who was 20 years old at the time of testing. She was born 
prematurely and has reduced bilateral hippocampal volume by approximately 30% relative to 
healthy controls (see Figure 2.1, Hurley, Maguire, & Vargha-Khadem, 2011; Olsen et al., 2013). 
H.C.’s compromised bilateral hippocampal development appears to have precluded normal 
development of her autobiographical episodic memory. H.C.’s autobiographical episodic 
memory impairment has been well-documented by several groups (Hurley et al., 2011; 
Rosenbaum et al., 2011; Vargha-Khadem et al., 2003). She has impaired memory for personal 
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and public life events, but relatively intact personal and general semantic memory (Rosenbaum 
et al., 2011), which is consistent with other developmental amnesic individuals (Gadian et al., 
2000). H.C. consistently shows specific impairment on standardized tests of anterograde and 
retrograde autobiographical episodic memory (see Table 2.1 and Appendix B for scores on 
neuropsychological tests). Experimental testing has corroborated a significant autobiographical 
episodic memory deficit based on a variety of tests with different methods of cueing and scoring 
(Hurley et al., 2011; Kwan et al., 2010; Rosenbaum et al., 2011). These deficits also extend to 
her ability to imagine future personal experiences (Kwan et al., 2010; cf. Hurley et al., 2011). 
         
Figure 2.1. Selected Coronal Slices of an MRI Scan in H.C. (left) and an Age- and Sex-Matched 
Healthy Control Participant (right).  
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Table 2.1 
 
H.C.’s Performance on Standardized Tests of Autobiographical Episodic Memory 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
          Standardized Test                                                                   H.C.’s Test Score 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
  
     RBMT (raw score)
1
  7 (impaired) 
     RBMT-Extended  (raw score)
2
  10 (impaired) 
 
     California Verbal Learning Test-II
3
  
           Acquisition (T-score) 38 
           Short delay free recall (Z-score) -4 
           Long delay free recall (Z-score) -3 
           Recognition (Z-score) -2 
 
     Rey Osterrieth Complex Figure (T-score)
3
 
 
           Immediate recall  <20 
           Delayed recall  <20 
           Delayed recognition  22 
  
     Wechsler Memory Scale-III (standard score)
2
 
            General memory 49 
           Verbal – Immediate Recall 71 
           Verbal – Delayed Recall 46 
           Visual – Immediate Recall 71 
           Visual – Delayed Recall 59 
           Delayed Recognition 75 
 
      Wechsler Memory Scale –III (scaled score)3 
            Logical Memory I – Immediate recall   4 
           Logical Memory II – Delayed recall     1 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
RBMT, Rivermead-Behavioural Memory Test;  
1
Score reported in Vargha-Khadem et al., 2003; 
2 
Scores reported in Hurley et al., 2011; 
3
Scores reported 
in Rosenbaum et al., 2011. 
 
 
Despite H.C.’s impaired autobiographical episodic memory, she is an otherwise healthy 
individual. She successfully graduated from a mainstream high school, completed one year of 
technical college, and was enrolled in a postsecondary culinary program at the time of testing, 
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although withdrew from this program a year later. She was engaged to be married at the time of 
testing.  
In the current study, H.C.’s performance was compared to that of 17 right-handed, 
healthy women with no reported history of neurological or psychiatric illness (mean age = 19.3 
years, SD = 1.2; mean education = 13.3 years, SD = 1.1). All participants gave informed written 
consent in accordance with the ethics review boards at York University and Baycrest. 
Materials and Procedure  
 
Participants were tested on several standard ToM tasks that are commonly used in patient 
and neuroimaging studies. The tasks varied in terms of cognitive versus affective content, use of 
hypothetical verbal narratives, and the type of cues available for inferring a mental state 
(Rosenbaum et al., 2007). Data were analyzed using a two-tailed modified t-test procedure, 
which compares test scores of a single patient to that of a small control sample (Crawford & 
Howell, 1998).  
False Belief Test (Stone et al., 1998): Participants were assessed on their ability to 
represent another person’s mistaken belief about the location of an object that differed from their 
own belief (first-order) as well as a second person’s mistaken belief about the first person’s 
belief about the location of an object (second-order). There were five first-order and five second-
order passages. For each passage a maximum of 2 points were assigned (1 point each for 
identifying the actual location of the object and for identifying the character’s belief about the 
object’s location).  
Faux Pas Test (Stone et al., 1998): On this more affective measure of ToM, participants 
were asked to determine if a character unintentionally hurt a second character’s feelings as a 
result of not knowing certain information. Ten passages were presented to participants, with a 
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maximum score of 3 points per passage (1 point each for correctly identifying the faux pas, 
explaining why it should not have been made, and inferring how it might have affected the 
recipient).  
Mind-in-the-Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001): Participants were tested on their 
ability to infer thoughts and emotions from 36 black and white photographs of the eye region of 
faces. Participants were asked to choose among four adjectives that best described what the 
person in each photograph was thinking or feeling.  
Sarcasm and Empathy Test (Dennis, Purvis, Barnes, Wilkinson, & Winner, 2001): This 
task assessed participants’ appreciation of literal and nonliteral utterances from visual and 
intonation cues. Twelve real-world scenarios were presented to participants, with an equal 
number of scenarios assessing participants’ understanding of literal truths, deceptive praise (i.e., 
the opposite of what is said is meant, with an empathic intent), and ironic criticism (i.e., the 
opposite of what is said is meant, with a sarcastic intent). One point was assigned to each 
response that demonstrated the participant’s ability to make a first-and second-order inference 
with respect to the characters’ beliefs about their own actions as well as the intentions of the 
other character (i.e., a maximum of 4 points per scenario).  
Visual Perspective-Taking and Deception Tests (Stuss et al., 2001): In the “Transfer of 
Inference” condition, participants were asked to make an inference about the location of a ball 
that was hidden under one of five cups based on the pointing of one of two confederates with the 
same vantage point as the experimenter across six trials. Scoring was based on the number of 
correct trials. The “Deception” condition involved only two possible locations, and participants 
were asked to infer the deceptive intent of a confederate who pointed to the wrong location. The 
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measure of interest for the “Deception” condition was the trial number corresponding to the first 
of five consecutive trials correct (i.e., fewer trials indicate better performance).  
Animations Test (Castelli, Happé, Frith, & Frith, 2000): Participants were tested on their 
ability to represent complex intentions based on the movement of pairs of triangles. Action 
sequences (3 practice, 12 test) were presented, with an equal number of sequences depicting 
random movements (e.g., drifting), goal-directed movements (e.g., dancing), and more complex 
interactions requiring ToM (e.g., mocking). After viewing each sequence, participants judged 
whether an interaction took place and the nature of the interaction. Responses were scored for 
appropriateness of the descriptions (0–3), that is, how well the underlying script was captured as 
well as the level of intentionality between the triangles (0–5), that is, the degree of appreciation 
of mental states. Responses were scored by two independent raters who achieved a similar level 
of agreement based on the criteria described in Castelli and colleagues (2000). Discrepancies, 
which were few, were resolved by a third rater. 
Results 
 
H.C. and the control participants’ performance on the various ToM tests is shown in 
Table 2.2. H.C.’s performance was equivalent to controls on all six ToM tests. More specifically, 
she achieved perfect or near perfect scores on the False Belief test, the Faux Pas test, and 
Sarcasm and Empathy tests. On the Animations test, H.C.’s performance did not differ from that 
of controls in terms of the appropriateness and intentionality ratings given to descriptions of 
random and goal-directed animations. For the ToM animations, there was a trend towards H.C. 
scoring lower on the appropriateness measure, but there was no significant difference in 
performance based on the intentionality measure. 
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Table 2.2 
 
H.C. and Controls’ Performance on Theory of Mind Tests  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
             
       ToM test                       H.C.          Control mean (SD)          t-test results 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
False Belief Test 
   
 
First-order (/10) 10 9.9 (0.2)    t16 = 0.49, p = .63 
 
Second-order (/10) 9 9.4 (0.8) t16 = -0.49, p = .63 
Faux Pas Test (/30) 
30 25.3 (5.6) t16 = 0.82, p = .43 
 
The Mind-in the-Eyes Test (/36) 
29 26.5 (3.9) t16 = 0.62, p = .54 
 
Sarcasm and Empathy Test 
    Literal truth (/16) 16 15.8 (0.75) t16 = 0.26, p = .80 
 
Ironic criticism (/16) 16 15.8 (0.97) t16 = 0.20, p = .84 
 
Deceptive praise (/16) 16 15.5 (1.12) t16 = 0.43, p = .67 
Visual-Perspective Taking and Deception 
Tasks 
   
 
Transfer of inference (/6)       6 5.7 (0.85) t16 = 0.34, p = .74 
 
Deception  condition 
(lower score indicates better 
performance) 
2 5.4 (4.6) t16 = -0.72, p = .48 
Animations Test 
            Random 
    
 
Appropriateness (/3)   2  2.6 (0.47)  t16 = -1.2, p = .23 
 
Intentionality (/5),  
target score = 1.0 
1.5  0.5 (0.67) t16 = 1.5, p = .16 
  Goal-directed 
    
 
Appropriateness (/3) 2.8 2.6 (0.39)  t16 = 0.50, p = .63 
 
Intentionality (/5),  
target score = 3.0 
2 2.3 (0.39) t16 = -0.75, p = .47 
         Theory of mind 
    
 
Appropriateness (/3) 2 2.5 (0.27) t16 = -1.8, p = .09 
 
Intentionality (/5), 
target score = 5.0 
3.5 4.0 (0.54) t16 = -0.90, p = .38 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
The number in parentheses in the left-hand column indicates the maximum score for each section 
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Discussion 
 
The current study tested the claim that the development of AM is critical for the 
development of ToM. To do so, ToM abilities were examined in H.C., a young woman with 
impaired AM development due to hippocampal damage during fetal development. Specifically, 
H.C. was tested on a comprehensive battery of objective measures known to be sensitive to ToM 
impairment. Despite impaired AM development, H.C. performed normally on all tests of ToM. 
Previous research has shown that performance on these same ToM tests correlates with normal 
AM development and with activation in the set of brain regions associated with AM. 
Nevertheless, H.C. had no difficulty inferring other people’s mental states as revealed by tests 
assessing her ability to detect a false belief, faux pas, or intent that is sarcastic, empathic, or 
deceptive, nor did she have difficulty inferring others’ mental states by relying on the eye region 
of faces or visual cues. Together with similar findings in the adult-onset amnesic cases K.C. and 
M.L. (Rosenbaum et al., 2007), it is apparent that AM is not necessary for intact performance on 
laboratory tests of ToM. This appears to hold true whether AM fails to develop normally or is 
impaired later in life, after it has fully developed. Anecdotal observations in both H.C. and 
patient Jon, the most studied case of developmental amnesia, also support the notion that 
individuals with impaired AM development are nonetheless capable of basic ToM. For example, 
both patients are capable of understanding and performing ‘remember-know’ memory tasks in 
which participants are asked to introspect and judge whether their memory of items involves a 
recollective experience or is based on familiarity (Brandt, Gardiner, Vargha-Khadem, Baddeley, 
& Mishkin, 2006; Düzel, Vargha-Khadem, Heinze, & Mishkin, 2001; Horner et al., 2012). H.C. 
and Jon’s respective capacities to understand such instructions suggest that they can appreciate 
28 
 
fine distinctions of how others experience memory and can apply these distinctions to their own 
internal representations.  
The current data suggest that rather than referring to specific episodes from one’s past, 
ToM may be achieved via social semantic memory, which appears to be relatively intact in 
hippocampal amnesia. This may include reliance on scripts and social norms in order to 
understand how the average person is likely to think and feel in a given situation (Lieberman, 
2012). This interpretation is supported by the finding that patients with semantic dementia, 
who suffer from a profound loss of semantic knowledge in the context of relatively preserved 
AM, perform poorly on a wide range of ToM tests (Duval et al., 2012; cf. Michel et al., 2013 for 
a case study on the same topic). Furthermore, recent fMRI studies directly comparing AM with 
ToM in healthy people show greater activity during ToM in lateral frontal and temporal regions, 
which are known to be involved in semantic memory. In contrast, midline regions, such as 
medial prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, and posterior cingulate cortex are activated to a greater 
extent during AM (Rabin et al., 2010; Spreng & Grady, 2010). Indeed, there is strong evidence 
to suggest that individuals with developmental amnesia are capable of learning new semantic 
information, albeit in a more laborious way (Gardiner, Brandt, Baddeley, Vargha-Khadem, & 
Mishkin, 2008; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997), presumably via temporal neocortex (McClelland, 
McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; Sharon, Moscovitch, & Gilboa, 2011). Therefore, it is possible 
that semantic memory, rather than AM, is crucial for the development and expression of ToM; 
however, further work is needed to help understand its precise contribution.  
The present findings do not rule out the possibility that under certain conditions non-
amnesic individuals might rely on AM to infer other people’s mental states or, alternatively, that 
a common process underlies AM, ToM, and other abilities associated with the default mode 
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network. Healthy people recruit regions known to be involved in AM when performing 
laboratory tests of ToM, such as the ones included in the current study (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; 
Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Spreng et al., 2009). However, when the two abilities are directly 
compared in neuroimaging studies of healthy adults, differences in regional activity emerge 
(Rabin et al., 2010; Spreng & Grady, 2010). Furthermore, in contrast to findings in the 
developmental literature, the evidence of a behavioural relationship in healthy adults is sparse. 
Two behavioural studies that report an association between AM and ToM involved pathological 
populations (Adler et al., 2010; Corcoran & Frith, 2003) and report only a partial association in 
healthy controls (Adler et al., 2010) or were unable to explore the relationship due to a limited 
range of scores on both AM and ToM tests (Corcoran & Frith, 2003). 
 It is possible that ceiling effects account for the absence of a detectable difference in 
ToM on the False Belief, Faux Pas, and Sarcasm and Empathy tests on which H.C. and controls 
achieved perfect or near-perfect scores. However, several clinical populations show impaired 
performance on these same tasks (Dennis et al., 2001; Duval et al., 2012; Gregory et al., 2002; 
Stone et al., 1998). Notably, H.C.’s performance did not differ from that of controls on tests that 
did not produce ceiling effects, including (a) The Mind-in-the-Eyes test; (b) a deception test, 
which has proven sensitive to ToM impairment in patients with focal lesions in medial PFC 
(Stuss et al., 2001); and (c) the intentionality measure of the Animations test. There was, 
however, a trend towards worse performance in H.C. than controls on the ToM appropriateness 
measure of the Animations test. H.C’s score on this measure may suggest that she has a general 
understanding of the underlying scenario but has subtle difficulties in deciphering the specific 
interactions between two agents. In these circumstances access to relevant past episodes may 
facilitate a precise understanding of current situations (White, Coniston, Rogers, & Frith, 2011; 
30 
 
Zwickel, White, Coniston, Senju, & Frith, 2011), and therefore may explain her poor 
performance. For instance, H.C.’s reduced ability to access specific situations in which she 
experienced a complex interaction, such as being coaxed, may hinder a complete appreciation of 
this type of interaction in other people. To reduce the possibility of ceiling effects, future 
research should focus on developing and implementing more sensitive real-world tests of ToM, 
such as those used in several recent studies (St. Jacques et al., 2011; Rabin et al., 2010; Spreng & 
Grady, 2010). Taken together, the current findings demonstrate that successful performance on a 
wide range of laboratory tests of ToM can be achieved without the normal development of AM.  
The finding that ToM does not depend on the normal development of AM highlights the 
danger in interpreting correlations in behaviour as causal, whether in neuroimaging, in child 
development, or in clinical populations. These findings instead suggest that the relationship 
between AM and ToM is mediated by other factors. One possibility is that both abilities improve 
independently over the same time period as a result of higher order domain-general 
neurocognitive maturation (Fivush, 2011; Perner & Ruffman, 1995; Perner et al., 2007; 
Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). It may also be the case that, in the face of AM impairment, 
ToM can be achieved via implicit, automatic processes, which were not assessed in the current 
study (Frith & Frith, 2012; Low & Perner, 2012). However, it is unlikely that this explanation 
provides a complete account of H.C.’s successful performance on the tasks administered here 
given that only overt responses were scored. Another possibility is that both AM and ToM 
depend on semantic memory or general language abilities, which are not always taken into 
account (Perner & Ruffman, 1995; Perner et al., 2007; Welch-Ross, 1997). The latter is 
particularly important to control for in studies employing tasks that rely heavily on verbal output. 
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For example, a relationship between AM and ToM identified in children (Welch-Ross, 1997) 
was dismissed once language skills were properly controlled (Reese & Cleveland, 2006).  
 In conclusion, H.C. performed normally on tests of ToM that correlate with AM 
development and that activate the set of brain regions known to support AM. These findings 
provide convincing evidence that the normal development of AM is not essential for the 
development of ToM, thereby urging caution in interpreting correlations in neuroimaging or 
behavioural data as causal. Theories of child development that view AM as a prerequisite for the 
development of ToM should be revisited in light of the current findings. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Experiment 2: Familiarity Modulates the Functional Relationship Between 
Theory of Mind and Autobiographical Memory 
 
In the previous experiment I showed that the normal development of AM is not necessary 
for the normal development of ToM, as measured by a battery of standard ToM tests. One 
criticism of standard ToM tests is that they employ highly-controlled and artificial stimuli and 
use strangers or fictional characters as targets (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Stone et al., 1998; Stuss 
et al., 2001). In real life, however, ToM typically involves repeated interactions with personally 
known others, such as family members, close friends, and co-workers. Indeed, knowing someone 
for a long period of time and observing that person’s behaviour in different situations provides a 
rich source of information on which one can draw when imagining that person’s mental 
experiences. Therefore, AM might preferentially benefit ToM when the target person is 
personally known. 
Several recent fMRI studies suggest that a personal relationship or the ability to identify 
with the target person in a ToM or perspective-taking task can modulate neural activity. In one 
study, imagining painful scenarios from one's own perspective and the perspective of a loved one 
showed overlapping activity within the anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula, whereas 
imagining the scenarios from a stranger's perspective elicited greater activity in the superior 
frontal gyrus and right TPJ (Cheng, Chen, Lin, Chou, & Decety, 2010). Separate work by 
Mitchell and colleagues (2005, 2006) has shown that perceivers selectively engage in self-
referential strategies supported by the ventral medial PFC when inferring the mental states of 
similar others but not when inferring the mental states of dissimilar others. Another study 
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examined the contribution of AM, as measured by hippocampal activity, to emotion judgments 
of others. In that study, participants were scanned while making judgments relating to the self as 
well as protagonists deemed similar to the self and those deemed dissimilar from the self. The 
authors found increased hippocampal activity when participants made judgments about similar 
versus dissimilar others, but only when participants had a personal memory of the event 
involving the similar other (Perry et al., 2011). Taken together, these studies suggest that the 
strategy adopted to infer another person's mental state depends on whether that person is 
personally known or is perceived as similar to oneself. 
In this experiment, I tested the idea that AM and semantic memory interact in different 
ways during ToM depending on whether the target person is personally known or unknown. This 
idea extends from the transformation hypothesis, which suggests that there is a dynamic 
relationship between AM supported by the hippocampus and semanticized versions of the 
original memory supported by the neocortex (Moscovitch et al., 2005, 2006; Rosenbaum, et al., 
2001; Winocur & Moscovitch, 2011; Winocur et al., 2010; for similar ideas see Spreng & Mar, 
2012). To this end, I modified the paradigm used in a previous fMRI study (Rabin et al., 2010) 
and included a ToM condition that involved imagining events from the perspective of personally 
familiar others (i.e., relatives and close friends). Therefore, in the current study, participants were 
scanned with fMRI as they recollected past events in response to personal photos (AM condition) 
and imagined the experiences of other people in response to photos of  personally familiar others 
(pToM condition) and unfamiliar others (ToM condition). In the latter two conditions, 
participants selected one person from the photo and imagined an experience from that person’s 
perspective. I predicted that familiarity with the target person would modulate the functional 
relationship between AM and ToM such that AM would show greater neural overlap with pToM 
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than with ToM. Furthermore, it was expected that relative to ToM, pToM would elicit greater 
activity within midline regions, including the hippocampus, suggesting some reliance on past 
autobiographical experiences. Conversely, ToM was expected to show greater activity than 
pToM within lateral frontal and lateral temporal regions – a pattern that has been associated with 
accessing semantic knowledge (Martin & Chao, 2001). Nevertheless, AM and semantic memory 
are not viewed as mutually exclusive; instead, they are believed to interact to support ToM (at 
least in healthy people), although one type of memory may dominate depending on whether one 
has a personal relationship with the target person. 
In the current study, fMRI data were analyzed with Spatiotemporal partial least squares 
(ST-PLS), a multivariate technique that identifies time-varying distributed patterns of activity 
that differentiate experimental conditions (McIntosh & Lobaugh, 2004). Unlike univariate event-
related analyses, ST-PLS does not make assumptions about the shape and time course of the 
hemodynamic response function. Moreover, ST-PLS can provide a more sensitive statistical 
assessment than univariate analyses, as all voxels are analyzed in one single analytic step, thus 
eliminating the issue of multiple comparisons. In the present study, I focused on early and late 
phases of event generation in order to capture differences that may exist during the construction 
and elaboration of events, respectively (Addis et al., 2007; Rabin et al., 2010). 
Method 
Participants 
 
Eighteen right-handed, healthy women with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no 
reported history of neurological or psychiatric illness participated in the study (mean age =19.3 
years, SD =1.2; mean education = 13.3 years, SD =1.1). Note that this is the same sample used in 
Experiment 1 with one additional participant. Participants gave informed written consent in 
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accordance with the ethics committees at York University and Baycrest. Participants received 
monetary compensation for their time. 
Stimuli 
 
A real-world family photos test of mental state attributions was modified to include a 
ToM condition that involved personally known others (Rabin et al., 2010). Three conditions 
were developed for presentation to participants during scanning: personally experienced events 
(AM), events experienced by personally known others (pToM), and unknown events involving 
unfamiliar others (ToM). The AM condition consisted of 15 personal family photos of events 
that took place within the past 1 to 5 years. Thirteen of the 18 participants appeared in each AM 
photo. Analyses confirmed that the presence or absence of participants in the AM photos did not 
affect the behavioural or fMRI results (see Results section). A relative or close friend of each 
participant collected the photos to reduce the likelihood that the events in the photos were 
rehearsed prior to scanning. The pToM condition consisted of 15 photos depicting specific 
events that had been experienced by family members and close friends but not by the participant 
him/herself. This was to ensure that the pToM events were not confounded with AM. These 
photos were also collected by a relative or close friend of the participant to ensure that the photos 
were not seen prior to scanning and that photo selection was not biased in any way. The ToM 
condition consisted of 15 photos depicting unfamiliar people engaged in specific events that 
were matched to each AM photo by the experimenter according to theme (e.g., birthday party, 
picnic), scenery (e.g., indoor vs. outdoor), and time period from which the photo was taken. All 
photos were resized and converted to gray scale (see Figure 3.1 for an example of the stimuli 
employed). 
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Two control conditions were included in this study. One control condition consisted of 
luminance judgments made in response to scrambled photos. Matlab was used to scramble the 
pixels of each AM, pToM, and ToM photo to produce a corresponding image matched in visual 
complexity and luminance. The second control condition consisted of an odd–even number 
judgment task. This second control condition was included because it has been shown that 
activity, particularly within the MTL, can vary depending on the type of control condition used 
(Stark & Squire, 2001). 
E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) was used for the 
presentation of stimuli as well as for the collection of reaction times and response data. 
Responses were made on an MR-compatible four-button response box. 
Task 
 
At the beginning of each run, participants viewed a set of instructions that corresponded 
to one of the three conditions (i.e., AM, pToM, or ToM). Each run contained five photos from 
Figure 3.1. An Example of the Stimuli Used in the Family Photos Task. 
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one of the conditions. Each photo was presented for 20 seconds and was followed by three rating 
scales (see below). Trials were separated by a 2-second rest period during which a fixation cross 
was presented. There were three runs for each condition (for a total of nine runs), which were 
presented in pseudorandom order. Each run lasted for 5 minutes and 4 seconds. As indicated in 
Figure 3.1, in the AM condition, participants were presented with their own photos and asked to 
recollect the event depicted in each photo in as much detail as possible. They were told to focus 
on what they were thinking and feeling at the time. For the pToM and ToM conditions, 
participants were presented with photos of other people and asked to generate a novel event for 
each photo while focusing on what one person in the photo might have been thinking and feeling 
at the time. Participants were specifically instructed to not draw on past experiences when 
generating these events. Participants were told to press a specified button on the response box 
once an event had come into mind, whether remembered or imagined. Response times were 
recorded and demarcated the end of an initial construction phase (i.e., searching/initial 
generation of the event) and the beginning of an elaboration phase. For the elaboration phase, 
participants were told to continue to retrieve or generate as many details as possible for the 
event. The elaboration phase continued until the photo was no longer present on the screen. All 
photos remained on the screen for 20 seconds, regardless of when responses were made, to 
maximize the recollection/generation of details associated with each event. 
Following the presentation of each photo, participants rated the event they 
recollected/imagined on a number of dimensions known to influence neural activity. Three 
ratings scales were presented after each photo. The first rating scale differed for AM and 
pToM/ToM events. AM events were rated on the extent to which events were recollected or 
familiar (1 = don't know event; 2 = familiar with event; 3 = remember event; (Gardiner, 
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Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1998; Tulving, 1985). Participants were instructed to select 
“remember” if the event was specific to a time and place and they could re-experience it, to 
select “familiar with event” if the event was familiar to them, but they could not recall any 
specific contextual or other experiential details associated with the event, and to select “don't 
know event” if they were unable to recall any aspect of the event. The imagined pToM and ToM 
events were rated on a 4-point scale for likeness to an actual memory in which 1 = exactly like a 
memory and 4 = nothing like a memory. The next two ratings scales were employed for all 
conditions. One scale assessed the amount of detail retrieved or imagined for each event (ranging 
from 1 = not vivid to 4 = very vivid), and the other scale assessed the spatial coherence of each 
event (contiguousness of the spatial context: 1 = fragmented scenes to 4 = continuous scene; 
Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007). The 
responses from the spatial coherence scale are not reported here, as participants had difficulty 
making these ratings. Following the rating scales, the corresponding scrambled photo was 
presented, and participants were asked to indicate with a button press whether the photo was dark 
or light in brightness. The second baseline task followed and consisted of an odd–even number 
judgment task, in which participants were presented with a number from 1 to 9 and were asked to 
indicate with a button press whether the number was odd or even. Immediately prior to the scan, 
a short training session was provided to ensure that participants fully understood the task 
instructions. The photos used in the training session were not used during the scan. 
Postscan Interview 
 
Immediately following the scan, participants took part in an interview in which they 
viewed the same photos that had been presented in the scanner. To help prevent re-encoding or 
repeated retrieval of events in the scanner, participants were not told of the postscan interview 
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until after the scanning session. Participants were asked to think back to the events they had 
generated in the scanner and to rate each event on the same three scales that were presented in 
the scanner. Postscan ratings were collected in case a within-scanner rating was not provided. 
The photos with the highest vividness ratings (approximately two-thirds of all photos) were 
selected for a semistructured interview in which participants described the events as they had 
been recollected or imagined in the scanner. The events were recorded and then transcribed for 
scoring. Narratives were scored using an adapted Autobiographical Interview scoring procedure 
described by Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, and Moscovitch (2002). The Autobiographical 
Interview was developed to quantify episodic and semantic contributions to AM, but has been 
successfully employed in a number of studies examining non-mnemonic abilities, such as future 
thinking (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; Kwan et al., 2010) and describing pictures of scenes 
(Race et al., 2011). Narratives were segmented into distinct details, which were classified as 
internal (including event-specific, temporal, perceptual, spatial, and thought/emotion details) or 
external (including semantic facts, repetitions, or metacognitive statements; see Appendix A for 
an example of a scored narrative). Analyses of the postscan narratives were conducted by a 
trained rater who achieved high interrater reliability on the Autobiographical Interview 
(intraclass correlation coefficient, two-way random effects model; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) using a 
standard set of previously scored memories (Levine et al., 2002). 
Data Acquisition 
 
Brain imaging data were acquired with a Siemens Trio 3T magnet with a 12-channel head 
coil. Anatomical scans were acquired using a T1- weighted volumetric MRI (TR=2000 ms, 
TE=2.63 ms, 160 oblique axial slices, 1.0mm thick, FOV=256 mm). Functional scans were 
acquired with a whole-head T2*-weighted EPI pulse sequence (TR=2000 ms, TE=30 ms, flip 
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angle=70°, FOV=200 mm, 64×64 acquisition matrix), consisting of 30 contiguous, 5-mm-thick 
axial slices. Physiological data (heart and respiration rate) were acquired during the scanning 
session. Stimuli were presented visually through a mirror mounted on a coil that reflected images 
from a projector located at the bottom of the scanner. Images were reconstructed and 
preprocessed with AFNI (Cox, 1996). The initial 10 time points of each run, in which transient 
signal changes occur as brain magnetization reaches a steady state, were excluded. The data were 
first corrected for respiration and heart rate. Next, slice-timing was corrected to the first slice, 
followed by motion correction using a 3-D Fourier transform interpolation using a functional 
volume that minimized the amount of motion to less than 2 mm. The images were spatially 
normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template and smoothed using an 8-mm 
FWHM Gaussian kernel. The final voxel size was 4 mm × 4 mm × 4 mm. 
Data Analysis 
 
Data analysis was restricted to AM events that were successfully recollected (i.e., events 
rated as “remembered”), pToM and ToM events rated as novel (i.e., “nothing like a memory,” 
corresponding to a rating of 3 or 4), and AM, pToM, and ToM events rated as vividly 
recollected/imagined (i.e., vividness rating of 3 or 4), as vividness is known to influence activity 
in regions associated with the generation of AM and ToM events (Gilboa et al., 2004; Rabin et 
al., 2010). Within-scanner ratings (vs. postscan ratings) were used, as these were believed to be 
more reliable. However, in four instances in which a within-scanner rating was missing, the 
corresponding rating provided during the postscan interview was used (three vividness ratings 
for AM events and one rating indicating ‘likeness to an actual memory’ for a pToM event). 
The fMRI data were analyzed with ST-PLS (McIntosh et al., 2004), a multivariate 
technique similar to principal components analysis that identifies time-varying distributed 
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patterns of activity that differentiate experimental conditions. Unlike univariate event-related 
analyses, ST-PLS is not dependent upon assumptions about the shape and time course of the 
hemodynamic response function. Moreover, it is more sensitive than univariate analysis, as all 
voxels are analyzed in a single analytic step and therefore eliminates the need for post hoc 
correction due to multiple comparisons. For the current study, a 20-second temporal window was 
specified for each event (i.e., 10 TRs), and the onset of trials was specified at 2 seconds after 
stimulus onset. 
Using singular value decomposition applied to the covariance matrix of task and 
functional activation, ST-PLS extracts ranked latent variables (LV), or orthogonal patterns of 
brain activity, that express how well brain activity covaries with each condition. When applying 
ST-PLS to event-related data, patterns of brain activity reliably related to task conditions are 
calculated for each poststimulus TR for each LV (McIntosh & Lobaugh, 2004). This provides 
information on the time course of activity associated with the experimental conditions. Each 
voxel is given a weight within each LV, known as a salience, which indicates how that voxel is 
related to the LV. A salience can be positive or negative, depending on whether the voxel shows 
a positive or negative correlation with the pattern identified by the LV. These salience values are 
then multiplied by the blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) signal value in that voxel and 
summed across all voxels to derive an estimate of how robustly each participant displays that 
spatial pattern (known as a ‘brain score’). That is, the brain score indicates how strongly 
individual subjects express the patterns of the LV. 
 PLS uses two different methods to test statistical significance. Permutation tests assess 
whether the effect represented in a given LV captured by the singular value is sufficiently strong 
to be different from random noise. For the current experiment, 500 permutations were used. If 
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the probability was less than .05, the LV was considered significant. To provide reliability 
measures of the contribution of each voxel to the LV, a bootstrap that resampled the data 100 
times to estimate the standard error of each voxel's salience was used. The ratio of each salience 
to its standard error (bootstrap ratio; BSR) was calculated and is roughly equivalent to a z-score. 
Peak voxels with a BSR of ±3, p < .001, and containing a minimum size of 5 voxels were 
considered reliable. The bootstrap also estimated the 95% confidence intervals for the mean 
brain scores in each condition. The confidence intervals provide estimates of whether activity in 
each condition is reliably different from other conditions as well as different from the overall 
mean. I examined activity during an early phase (TRs 1 and 2, corresponding to activity 0–4 s 
after stimulus onset) and a late phase (TRs 4 and 5, corresponding to activity 6–10 s after 
stimulus onset) of event generation. The coordinates for the maximum peak of each cluster are 
reported in MNI space. 
First, I computed a PLS analysis that included AM, pToM, and ToM along with the two 
baseline conditions to ensure consistency with previous findings. In subsequent analyses I 
wanted to focus on the relationship among the three experimental conditions and therefore 
computed a PLS analysis that included only AM, pToM, and ToM. Because I had an a priori 
prediction regarding differences between pToM versus ToM and such an LV did not emerge (see 
Results section), I computed an additional ST-PLS analysis that included only pToM and ToM.  
Results 
 
Participants’ Presence in the AM Photos 
 To make a case for collapsing across the two AM subgroups (i.e., participants who 
appeared in their AM photos and participants who did not appear in their AM photos), it was 
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important to determine that there were no differences between the two subgroups. In order to do 
so, I examined participants’ behavioural data from the postscan interview and the fMRI data. 
 With respect to the behavioural data, a between-group t-test was used to compare the 
number of internal details generated in response to AM photos in which participants appeared 
versus AM photos in which participants did not appear. The analysis revealed no differences 
between the groups, suggesting that the type of AM photo used did not affect the number of 
internal details participants generated, t(17) = -.47, p = .64, 95% CI [-2.78, 1.76], d = -0.32. 
 To examine the fMRI data, a between-group ST-PLS analysis was computed that 
compared the AM photos in which participants appeared versus the AM photos in which 
participants did not appear. The results of this ST-PLS analysis were not significant, suggesting 
that the participants’ presence in the photos did not influence the pattern of neural activity. To 
provide additional support for collapsing across the two subgroups, I also ran two rotated ST-
PLS analyses that contained all three experimental tasks, with the AM condition differing 
between analyses. The two analyses included the AM photos in which participants were or were 
not present in their photos, respectively. These two ST-PLS analyses revealed the same results, 
once again helping to confirm that participants’ presence in their own photos did not influence 
the neural pattern of activity. Specifically, both analyses revealed one significant LV, which 
contrasted AM and pToM with ToM. LV2 was not significant in either of these analyses.  
Phenomenology of the AM, pToM, and ToM Events 
 
As mentioned above, only the following events were included in the analyses: AM events 
that were successfully recollected, pToM and ToM events rated as novel (i.e., different from a 
memory), and AM, pToM, and ToM events rated as vividly recollected/imagined. Events that 
did not have button response data distinguishing construction versus elaboration phases were 
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also excluded. Therefore, each participant contributed an average of 12.39 AM events (SD = 2.0, 
range 7 – 15), 10.61 pToM events (SD = 3.0, range 5 – 14), and 10.22 ToM events (SD = 3.0, 
range 5 – 14) to the analysis (out of 15 possible events for each condition). A repeated measures 
ANOVA indicated that the length of the construction phase significantly differed across AM (M 
= 1799 ms, SD = 719 ms), pToM (M = 2066 ms, SD = 843 ms), and ToM events (M = 2341 ms, 
SD = 850 ms; F(2, 34) = 8.86, p =.001). Post-hoc tests were computed using a Bonferroni 
adjustment that maintained a family-wise error rate of < .05. Results indicated that AM 
construction took significantly less time than pToM, t(17) = -2.69, p =.015, 95% CI [-479, -58], 
d = -0.35, and ToM construction, t(17) = -3.54, p = .003, 95% CI [-865, -219], d = -0.71. There 
was no difference between the construction of pToM and ToM events, t(17) = -2.1, p= .047, 
95% CI [-445, -4], d = -0.33. 
Postscan Interview 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA indicated that the number of internal details generated in 
response to AM (M = 8.53, SD = 1.99), pToM (M = 6.13, SD = 1.58), and ToM events (M = 
6.16, SD = 1.85) differed significantly, F(2, 34) = 29.1, p < .0001. Post-hoc tests were computed 
using a Bonferroni adjustment that maintained a family-wise error rate of p < .05. Results 
indicated that participants produced significantly more internal details in response to AM photos 
than pToM photos, t(17) = -5.76, p < .0001, 95% CI [1.52, 3.29], d = 1.37, and ToM photos, 
t(17) = -6.82, p < .0001, 95% CI [1.64, 3.10], d = 1.27. The number of internal details did not 
differ in response to pToM and ToM photos, t(17) = -.11, p =.91, 95% CI [1.64, 3.10], d = -0.02. 
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fMRI Results 
 
Common regions involved in AM, pToM, and ToM. 
I computed a PLS analysis that included the three experimental conditions (AM, pToM, 
and ToM) and the two baseline conditions (scrambled task and odd-even task) to ensure 
consistency with previous findings (Rabin et al., 2010). In this analysis, I examined brain activity 
only during the early phase of event generation because both baseline conditions were only 4 
seconds (and therefore comparisons could not be made beyond this 4-second period). This PLS 
analysis yielded two significant patterns of brain activity (i.e., LVs). As predicted, the first LV 
differentiated a pattern of brain activity contrasting AM, pToM and ToM with the two baseline 
conditions (p < .0001, explained variance = 70.5%; Figure 3.2A). The positive saliences listed in 
Table 3.1 and presented in warm colours in Figure 3.2B correspond to greater activity during 
AM, pToM, and ToM relative to the two baseline conditions. Common regions activated 
included the medial PFC, medial and lateral temporal regions, as well as medial and lateral 
parietal regions. In contrast, the negative saliences, presented in cool colours, correspond to 
greater activity during the baseline conditions. The second significant LV differentiated a pattern 
of brain activity contrasting AM and the odd-even baseline with the scrambled baseline (pToM 
and ToM were not significantly different from the mean and therefore did not contribute to this 
LV; p < .0001, explained variance = 17.89%). Given that this LV did not yield a meaningful 
pattern of activity, the results were not interpreted.  
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Figure 3.2. Common Pattern of Activity During AM, pToM, and ToM Versus Two Control Conditions 
(Latent Variable 1, p < .0001). (A) A plot of brain scores indicating the amount of correlation between 
each task and the associated pattern of brain activity. (B) Axial slices of the brain regions associated with 
AM, pToM, ToM (warm colours) vs. the two control conditions (cool colours). Activity is shown during 
an early phase (TRs 1 and 2) of event generation. The functional maps are overlaid on the average 
anatomical image from all participants. Left side of the brain is presented on the left. AM, 
autobiographical memory; pToM, personal theory of mind; ToM, theory of mind; NUM, odd-even 
number control condition; SCR = scrambled control condition. 
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Table 3.1 
 
Coordinates of Regions Associated with AM, pToM, and ToM Versus Two Control Conditions  
 
 
Hemis          Region                                    BA                  x                 y                  z             TR            BSR           vol. 
 
 
AM, pToM, and ToM > Control conditions during TR1 and TR2 
L Paracingulate Cortex 32/10 -8 44 4 1 6.9 7 
L Medial PFC 9 -20 28 28 1 8.6 19 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 36 24 40 1 8.4 34 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 -40 8 44 1 7.7 9 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus 6 -32 8 48 2 12.1 1339 
R Superior Frontal Gyrus 9/8 16 28 48 1 7.8 6 
R Ventrolateral PFC 47 52 24 0 2 9.9 55 
L Ventrolateral PFC 47 -48 24 -4 2 9.5 156 
R Hippocampus - 32 -28 -16 1 8.8 33 
L Hippocampus - -32 -28 -12 1 8.6 20 
L Amygdala - -32 -4 -20 2 6.9 5 
B PCC/RSC* 23/30 0 -52 12 1 10.7 516 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 60 0 -20 2 9.3 41 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 -60 -4 -20 2 10.6 61 
R pSTS 22 48 -52 8 1 9.0 68 
R Angular Gyrus 39 48 -64 24 1 7.3 17 
L Angular Gyrus 39 -44 -64 16 2 14.7 541 
R Fusiform Gyrus 37 40 -48 -24 1 10.9 72 
R Fusiform Gyrus 37 44 -56 -24 2 16.3 2154 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 19 -48 -72 4 1 12.1 190 
R Cerebellum - 8 -60 -28 1 7.8 16 
R Cerebellum - 16 -76 -36 1 6.9 9 
L Cerebellum - -16 -76 -28 1 8.6 13 
L Cerebellum - -12 -80 -36 2 7.5 26 
 
 
Control conditions > AM, pToM, and ToM during TR1 and TR2 
No regions      
         
 
 
 
 
MNI coordinates of the maximally activated voxel within each cluster are reported. AM = autobiographical memory 
condition; pToM = theory of mind condition involving personally known others; ToM = theory of mind condition 
involving unknown others; Hemis = hemisphere; BA = Brodmann area; Vol. = cluster volume in voxels; L = left; R 
= right; PFC = prefrontal cortex; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; RSC = retrosplenial cortex; pSTS = posterior 
superior temporal sulcus. 
*Activation in this region extended bilaterally 
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AM and pToM versus ToM. 
 
The PLS analysis that included AM, pToM, and ToM identified two significant patterns 
of brain activity (i.e., LVs). The first LV showed a pattern contrasting AM and pToM with ToM 
(p < .005, explained variance = 61.3%; Fig. 3.3A). The positive saliences, presented in warm 
colours, correspond to greater activity during AM and pToM relative to ToM, whereas the 
negative saliences, presented in cool colours, correspond to greater activity during ToM relative 
to AM and pToM (See Table 3.2 for a list of regions and Fig. 3.3B for a depiction of the 
saliences). I examined activity during early and late phases of event generation. During the early 
phase, all regions activated correlated with AM and pToM (vs. ToM) and included medial 
frontal, medial and lateral temporal, and medial parietal regions. During the late phase of event 
generation, AM and pToM continued to be supported by a similar network, but MTL regions 
were no longer involved. The opposite contrast showed that during the late phase ToM was 
associated with increased activity in bilateral ventrolateral PFC (BA 44), left insula, left lingual 
gyrus, right inferior temporal gyrus extending into middle occipital cortex, and bilateral occipital 
cortices (BA 19).  
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Figure 3.3. Differential Activity During AM and pToM Versus ToM (Latent Variable 1, p < .005). (A) A 
plot of brain scores, indicating the amount of correlation between each task and the associated pattern of 
brain activity. (B) Depicts axial slices of the brain regions associated with AM and pToM (warm colours) 
or ToM (cool colours). Activity is shown during an early phase (TRs 1 and 2) and a late phase (TRs 4 and 
5) of event generation. The functional maps are overlaid on the average anatomical image of all 
participants. Left side of the brain is presented on the left. AM, autobiographical memory; pToM, 
personal theory of mind; ToM, theory of mind. 
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Table 3.2 
 
Coordinates of Regions Associated with AM and pToM Versus ToM (LV 1) 
 
 
Hemis           Region                                BA                  x                  y                z              TR           BSR            vol. 
 
 
AM and pToM > ToM during TR1 and TR2 
R  Frontal Pole/medial PFC* 10/32 8 56 0 2 9.1 346 
R  Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 4 12 48 1 5.8 11 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus 6 -36 0 44 1 6.1 17 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus 8 -32 20 40 2 6.5 37 
R  Middle Frontal Gyrus 8 24 32 40 2 9.4 39 
R  Middle Frontal Gyrus 8 28 24 36 1 5.3 9 
L Cingulate Gyrus 24 -24 -16 48 1 5.4 5 
R Insula 13 40 -8 24 1 4.8 6 
L Hippocampus - -28 -20 -12 2 4.8 8 
L Parahippocampal Gyrus 19 -16 -44 -4 2 5.8 6 
L Parahippocampal Gyrus 36 -24 -44 -12 1 5.9 12 
R Parahippocampal Gyrus 30 20 -40 -4 2 5.5 21 
R Parahippocampal Gyrus 28 28 -24 -16 2 5.1 9 
L Parahippocampal Gyrus 36 -28 -36 -12 2 5.1 15 
R PCC/RSC/Precuneus* 23/30/31 8 -60 28 1 8.3 84 
L Precuneus* 31/7 -4 -52 36 1 5.1 5 
L Precuneus* 31/7 -8 -52 36 2 15.2 517 
L Angular Gyrus 39 -36 -64 32 2 8.9 200 
R Temporal Pole 38 44 20 -36 2 4.9 6 
L Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 -48 -20 -8 2 5.4 7 
L Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 -60 16 -4 2 5.4 13 
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 64 4 -8 2 5.4 6 
L Cuneus 18 -8 -80 36 2 4.7 10 
R Cerebellum - 8 -48 -44 1 6.0 21 
R Cerebellum - 40 -60 -52 2 5.3 10 
R Cerebellum - 24 -68 -40 2 4.8 13 
R Cerebellum - 8 -48 -48 2 5.3 6 
 
ToM > AM and pToM during TR1 and TR2 
No regions  
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Table 3.2 cont. 
 
Coordinates of Regions Associated with AM and pToM Versus ToM (LV 1) 
 
 
Hemis           Region                                BA                  x                  y                z              TR            BSR            vol. 
 
 
AM and pToM > ToM during TR4 and TR5 
R Frontal Pole/medial PFC 10 12 56 8 4 7.5 674 
L Paracingulate Cortex* 32 -8 32 0 5 8.1 543 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus 6 -32 20 44 4 5.3 15 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 8 28 32 40 5 7.2 72 
L PCC/RSC/Precuneus* 31/30/7 -12 -56 28 4 10.8 704 
L PCC/RSC/Precuneus* 23/30/31 -4 -44 28 5 9.8 749 
L Angular Gyrus 39 -40 -68 36 5 5.9 142 
R Supramarginal Gyrus 40 52 -64 28 4 7.0 157 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 -60 -16 -12 4 5.2 25 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 -60 -8 -16 5 4.0 8 
R Thalamus - 32 -32 0 4 4.5 13 
R Cerebellum - 8 -48 -52 4 5.6 35 
 
ToM > AM and pToM during TR4 and TR5 
R Ventrolateral PFC 44 52 20 8 5 -4.4 9 
L Ventrolateral PFC 44 -48 12 16 5 -4.9 27 
L Insula 13 -48 16 12 4 -4.9 8 
L Lingual Gyrus - -28 -76 8 5 -4.2 6 
R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 37 44 -68 0 5 -4.5 11 
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 19 36 -84 16 4 -4.7 11 
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 19 48 -72 8 4 -4.5 6 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 19 -36 -84 8 4 -4.5 12 
 
 
MNI coordinates of the maximally activated voxel within each cluster are reported. AM = autobiographical memory 
condition; pToM = theory of mind condition involving personally known others; ToM = theory of mind condition 
involving unknown others; Hemis = hemisphere; BA = Brodmann area; Vol. = cluster volume in voxels; R = right; 
L = left; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; RSC = retrosplenial cortex; PFC = prefrontal cortex. 
*Activation in this region extended bilaterally. 
 
 
The second significant LV differentiated a set of brain regions supporting AM from a 
separate set of regions supporting pToM (p = .026, explained variance = 38.7%; Fig. 3.4A). ToM 
was not significantly different from the mean and therefore did not contribute to this LV. The 
positive saliences, presented in warm colours, correspond to greater activity during AM, whereas 
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the negative saliences, presented in cool colours, correspond to greater activity during pToM 
(See Table 3.3 for a list of regions and Fig. 3.4B). During the early phase of event generation, the 
set of regions supporting AM included left cingulate gyrus (BA 32), right middle frontal gyrus 
(BA 46), left caudate, and right cerebellum, whereas left insula and right ventrolateral PFC 
activity emerged during pToM. Later in event generation, AM was associated with activity in the 
right posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (BA 23/31), whereas pToM was associated with a 
much more extensive set of regions that included the right frontal pole (BA 10), bilateral 
dorsomedial PFC (BA 9), bilateral ventrolateral PFC, left insula, bilateral lateral temporal cortex, 
left temporal pole (BA 38), bilateral thalamus, and bilateral occipital regions. 
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Figure 3.4. Differential Activity During AM Versus pToM (Latent Variable 2, p < .05). (A) A plot of 
brain scores, indicating the amount of correlation between each task and the associated pattern of brain 
activity. (B) Depicts axial slices of the brain regions associated with AM (warm colours) or pToM (cool 
colours). Activity is shown during an early phase (TRs 1 and 2) and a late phase (TRs 4 and 5) of event 
generation. The functional maps are overlaid on the average anatomical image from all participants. Left 
side of the brain is presented on the left). AM, autobiographical memory; pToM, personal theory of mind; 
ToM, theory of mind. 
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Table 3.3  
 
Coordinates of Regions Associated with AM Versus pToM (LV 2) 
 
 
Hemis          Region                              BA                    x                    y                 z             TR           BSR             vol. 
 
 
AM > pToM during TR1 and TR2 
L Cingulate Gyrus 32 -12 20 36 1 4.1 9 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 46 52 44 8 2 4.1 6 
L Caudate - -20 28 8 1 3.4 5 
R Cerebellum - 24 -68 -48 1 5.4 14 
  
pToM > AM during TR1 and TR2 
L Insula 13 -40 -4 -4 1 -4.2 5 
L Insula 13 -32 -16 20 1 -4.1 5 
R Ventrolateral PFC 45 48 24 20 2 3.3 10 
 
AM > pToM during TR4 and TR5 
R PCC/Precuneus 23/31 16  -56 20  5 4.7  8 
 
pToM > AM during TR4 and TR5 
R Frontal Pole 10 20 64 8 4 -4.3 14 
R Dorsomedial PFC* 9 8 44 32 5 -7.5 549 
R Dorsomedial PFC* 9 8 36 40 4 -5.6 123 
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 -40 0 52 4 -3.6 7 
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 -8 4 52 4 -5.9 81 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 36 20 28 5 -5.6 65 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 -52 12 36 5 -4.5 15 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 -40 8 28 4 -3.7 19 
L Ventrolateral PFC 47 -56 16 16 5 -5.1 73 
R Ventrolateral PFC 46/9 44 20 16 4 -5.7 125 
R Ventrolateral PFC 44 36 16 -28 5 -4.4 19 
R Cingulate Gyrus 31 12 -52 32 5 -4.6 29 
R Precentral Gyrus 6 40 8 36 5 -6.0 83 
L Insula 13 -36 -12 12 4 -3.6 5 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 56 0 -24 4 -4.9 32 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 64 -32 -4 4 -3.8 11 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 -56 4 -28 4 -4.0 5 
L Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 -40 -60 12 4 -4.3 60 
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 40 -60 12 4 -5.4 138 
R pSTS 39 56 -56 8 5 -6.2 378 
L Temporal Pole 38 -36 12 -24 5 -4.2 6 
R Thalamus - 16 -12 -4 4 -3.7 12 
L Thalamus - -12 -28 -4 4 -3.8 5 
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Table 3.3 cont. 
 
 
 Hemis           Region                               BA                  x                      y                z             TR           BSR             vol. 
 
L Lingual Gyrus 19 -24 -72 16 4 -3.7 6 
R Inferior Occipital Gyrus 19 36 -72 -4 5 -3.9 33 
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 18 24 -88 20 4 -4.2 25 
L Inferior Occipital Gyrus 18 -36 -88 0 4 -3.6 20 
 
 
MNI coordinates of the maximally activated voxel within each cluster are reported. AM = autobiographical memory; pToM = 
theory of mind involving personally known others; Hemis = hemisphere; BA = Brodmann area; Vol. = cluster volume in voxels; 
L = left; R = right; PFC = prefrontal cortex; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; pSTS = posterior superior temporal sulcus. 
*Activation in this region extended bilaterally. 
 
pToM versus ToM. 
 
The PLS analysis that included only pToM and ToM revealed one significant LV that 
differentiated pToM from ToM (p < .0001, explained variance = 100%; Fig. 3.5A). The positive 
saliences, presented in warm colours, correspond to greater activity during pToM, whereas the 
negative saliences, presented in cool colours, correspond to greater activity during ToM (See 
Table 3.4 for a list of regions and Fig. 3.5B). During the early phase of event generation, all 
activated regions correlated with pToM including bilateral frontal pole/paracingulate cortex (BA 
10/32), bilateral medial parietal cortex, bilateral hippocampus, bilateral lateral temporal cortex, 
bilateral temporal poles, and bilateral cerebellum. During the later phase of event generation, 
pToM continued to be associated with a very similar set of regions, with the exception of 
hippocampal activity, which was no longer present. In contrast, during the latter part of event 
generation, relative to pToM, ToM was associated with activity within left ventrolateral PFC 
(BA 44/45), left middle frontal gyrus (BA 6), left inferior temporal gyrus (BA 37), and left 
lingual gyrus extending into the superior occipital gyrus. 
 
 
56 
 
 
 
                     
                      
 
 
 
                       
 
 
Figure 3.5. Differential Activity During pToM Versus ToM (Latent Variable 1 (p < .0001) depicts brain 
activity during pToM vs. ToM. (A) A plot of brain scores, indicating the amount of correlation between 
each task and the associated pattern of brain activity. (B) Depicts axial slices of the brain regions 
associated with pToM (warm colours) or ToM (cool colours). Activity is shown during an early phase 
(TRs 1 and 2) and a late phase (TRs 4 and 5) of event generation. The functional maps are overlaid on the 
average anatomical image from all participants. Left side of the brain is presented on the left). pToM, 
personal theory of mind; ToM, theory of mind. 
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Table 3.4 
 
Coordinates of Regions Associated with pToM Versus ToM  
 
 
Hemis            Region                                    BA                    x                  y               z             TR            BSR         vol. 
 
 
pToM > ToM during TR1 and TR2 
R Frontal Pole/medial PFC* 10/32 12 52 4 2 6.6   751 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 8 28 20 40 1 5.5 19 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 8/9 24 32 40 2 7.2 104 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus 8 -28 12 44 2 5.7 61 
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 8 0 20 48 1 4.6 44 
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 8/9 -12 32 48 2 3.8 9 
L Cingulate Gyrus 24 -4 -16 44 1 3.1 6 
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 6/9 44 0 32 1 3.9 11 
L Inferior Frontal Gyrus 6/9 -36 4 36 1 6.4 61 
R Inferior Parietal Cortex 40 28 -40 56 2 3.8 7 
R Parahippocampal Gyrus - 40 -16 -16 2 5.0 122 
L Parahippocampal Gyrus - -36 -16 -24 1 4.2 11 
R Hippocampus - 28 -24 -16 2 4.9 99 
L Hippocampus - -24 -28 -12 2 3.9 35 
R PCC/RSC/Precuneus* 23/30/31 8 -60 28 1 6.8 230 
L Precuneus* 31/7 -8 -52 36 2 10.1 704 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 22 56 -32 0 1 4.0 7 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 22 -56 -32 4 2 4.1 5 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 22 -48 -20 -8 2 5.1 71 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 22 -48 -44 0 2 4.5 27 
L Inferior Temporal Gyrus 37 -48 -52 -12 1 3.8 7 
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 48 -20 4 1 3.8 8 
R Temporal Pole 38 48 16 -40 2 4.3 10 
L Temporal Pole 38 -48 12 -28 1 4.3 28 
L Temporal Pole 38 -32 12 -24 2 3.7 13 
R Angular Gyrus 39 36 -60 32 1 5.4 51 
R Angular Gyrus 39 44 -60 24 2 8.8 176 
L Angular Gyrus 39 -48 -72 20 1 4.1 11 
L Angular Gyrus 39 -48 -68 20 2 7.7 285 
L Fusiform Gyrus 37 -32 -44 -16 1 5.2 17 
R Insula 13 40 -8 24 1 4.4 22 
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 19 40 -68 -12 2 4.7 7 
R Thalamus - 8 -20 8 1 3.6 5 
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Table 3.4 cont.  
 
 
Hemis           Region                                        BA                 x                   y              z              TR           BSR           vol. 
 
R Cerebellum - 8 -52 -56 2 5.3 189 
R Cerebellum - 16 -64 -16 1 3.7 11 
L Cerebellum - -16 -40 -28 1 4.2 29 
L Cerebellum - -32 -76 -28 1 4.7 32 
 
ToM > pToM during TR1 and TR2 
No regions 
 
pToM > ToM during TR4 and TR5 
L Paracingulate Cortex* 10/32 -4 48 16 4 8.4 1035 
L Frontal Pole/medial PFC* 10/32 -12 56 8 5 8.4 1143 
R Paracingulate Cortex* 9/32 24 32 24 4 5.8 150 
L PCC/RSC/Precuneus* 
31/30/
7 -12 -56 28 4 10.4 1209 
L PCC/Precuneus* 23/31 -4 -56 20 5 9.9 873 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 52 -8 -20 4 4.2 7 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 -56 -20 -12 4 5.5 89 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 -56 -12 -16 5 5.3 77 
R Supramarginal Gyrus 40 56 -64 24 4 7.6 224 
R Supramarginal Gyrus 40 56 -64 24 5 6.1 130 
L Angular Gyrus 39 -40 -72 36 5 6.7 204 
R TP/Ventrolateral PFC 38/47 32 12 -16 4 3.8 5 
R Cerebellum - 36 -72 -36 4 5.0 55 
R Cerebellum - 4 -48 -48 5 6.8 85 
R Cerebellum - 12 -84 -36 5 4.5 21 
L Cerebellum - 0 -84 -28 4 5.0 12 
 
ToM > pToM during TR4 and TR5 
L Ventrolateral PFC 44 -48 16 12 4 -3.7 10 
L Ventrolateral PFC 44/45     -52 16 8 5 -3.3 7 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus 6 -52 0 44 5 -3.9 5 
L Inferior Temporal Gyrus  37 -56 -68 -4 4 -5.5 6 
R Supramarginal Gyrus 40 40 -40 36 4 -3.1 12 
L Lingual Gyrus 17 -12 -92 0 4 -3.6 5 
L Superior Occipital Gyrus                    17 -12 -92 4 5 -3.7 10 
 
MNI co-ordinates of the maximally activated voxel within each cluster are reported. pToM = theory of mind condition involving 
personally known others; ToM = theory of mind condition involving unknown others; Hemis = hemisphere; BA = Brodmann 
area; Vol. = cluster volume in voxels; R = right; L = left; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; RSC = retrosplenial cortex; TP = 
temporal pole; PFC = prefrontal cortex. 
*Activation in this region extended bilaterally. 
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Discussion 
 
In the present study, I tested whether different neural and cognitive mechanisms support 
mental state inferences of personally known versus unknown others and how these abilities relate 
to AM. Using ST-PLS, I replicated the finding that AM and ToM recruit a common pattern of 
activity that includes medial frontal, medial and lateral temporal, and medial parietal regions 
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Rabin et al., 2010; Spreng & Grady, 
2010; Spreng et al., 2009; Spreng & Mar, 2012). I also showed that when AM and ToM are 
directly compared, midline regions predominate during AM and more lateral regions 
predominate during ToM. Unique to the current study was the finding that the pattern of activity 
associated with pToM involving familiar others resembled the pattern of activity associated with 
AM to a greater extent than the pattern associated with ToM involving unfamiliar others, with 
the greatest degree of overlap within midline regions. This finding suggests that personal 
experience with the target person in a ToM task influences the functional and neural relationship 
between AM and ToM. A complementary finding was the observation of striking neural 
differences between pToM and ToM, suggesting that participants relied on different cognitive 
mechanisms to carry out these two tasks despite identical task instructions. 
Neural Overlap Between AM and pToM Versus ToM 
 
The results of the current study provide direct evidence that shared past experience with 
the target person in a ToM task modulates the functional relationship between AM and ToM. 
This was evident in the first latent variable (LV1) of the PLS analysis that included all three 
experimental conditions. This LV, which accounted for the greatest amount of variance in the 
analysis, revealed that the pattern of activity supporting pToM shares more in common with AM 
than with ToM. The greatest degree of neural overlap between AM and pToM was found within 
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bilateral medial PFC, medial parietal cortex, as well as hippocampus and related MTL structures 
– regions previously associated with autobiographical recollection (Svoboda, McKinnon, & 
Levine, 2006), self-referential processing (Amodio & Frith, 2006), and social relevance (Krienen 
et al., 2010).  
The shared set of regions recruited during AM and pToM suggests a strategy of relying 
on past personal experiences when considering the mental states of personally known others. 
This idea is in line with Buckner and Carroll's (2007) self-projection hypothesis, which suggests 
that one draws on past experiences in order to project oneself into another person's mind (for 
similar ideas see  Corcoran, 2000, 2001; Gallagher & Frith, 2003). It is also consistent with other 
simulation theories, which suggest that individuals rely on their own thoughts and feelings to 
predict the mental states of close and similar others. For example, using the medial PFC activity 
as an index, Mitchell and colleagues have shown that perceivers use the self as a proxy only 
when the target person is deemed similar to the self (Mitchell et al., 2005, 2006). Although 
participants in the present study did not rate how similar they perceived themselves to the people 
depicted in the pToM photos, other research indicates that individuals tend to share similar 
values with family members and close friends (Mashek, Aron, & Boncimino, 2003). However, 
more recent research has demonstrated that regions within the medial PFC respond more 
strongly when participants make judgments about friends compared to strangers, regardless of 
whether the other person is perceived as similar to the self (Krienen et al., 2010). This finding 
indicates that personal relevance (closeness), and not similarity is likely driving the neural 
overlap between AM and pToM. Lieberman (2012) suggests that individuals possess 
idiosyncratic theories about themselves as well as personally known others. Therefore, it is 
possible that these person-specific theories influenced how participants thought about themselves 
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in the past during the AM condition and how they thought about personally known others during 
the pToM condition. 
Participants in the present study were instructed not to refer to personal memories when 
generating pToM (and ToM) events, and only events rated by participants as different from a 
memory were included in the analysis. Because participants rarely rated pToM (and ToM) events 
as similar to a memory, I was unable to determine if the neural overlap between AM and pToM 
was modulated by the extent to which participants relied on specific AMs. Although it is unlikely 
that the pToM events were replicas of specific past experiences, it remains possible that 
participants consciously recalled past experiences in response to the pToM photos, yet rated 
these events as ‘dissimilar to a memory’ in order to comply with the experimenter's instruction to 
generate novel events. Given that only the events rated as different from a memory were 
included in the analysis, a more likely explanation is that previous episodes unintentionally 
influenced participants’ current social processing (Greenberg, Keane, Ryan, & Verfaellie, 2009; 
Sheldon & Moscovitch, 2010). It has been suggested that the mere perception of a familiar 
individual is associated with the spontaneous retrieval of personal knowledge about that 
individual (i.e., personal traits, attitudes, biographical facts and episodic memories; Gobbini & 
Haxby, 2007). This information may then be used to infer the familiar other's mental state.  
A related possibility is that the overlap may result from constructive processes that are at 
play during both AM and pToM. In AM past episodes are reconstructed, whereas in the pToM 
condition event details contained within AMs may be flexibly recombined to generate the novel 
events. This idea is captured by the “constructive-episodic-simulation hypothesis” proposed by 
Schacter and Addis (2007) to account for the neural overlap between AM and thinking about 
oneself in the future. The process of recombination is thought to rely on relational processes 
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mediated by the hippocampus (Davachi, 2004; Eichenbaum, 2001; Ryan, Althoff, Whitlow, & 
Cohen, 2000), which may be important for generating and/or binding autobiographical details for 
both past memories and imagined events (Rosenbaum, Gilboa, Levine, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 
2009). 
It remains the case, however, that all three conditions are supported by a common set of 
regions, albeit to a lesser degree for ToM involving unfamiliar others. Thus, AM may be called 
upon to infer others’ mental states in general, though it may be less critical and used together 
with other strategies, such as semantic memory, when unfamiliar others are concerned. 
Differences Between pToM Versus ToM 
 
The finding that AM and pToM bear close resemblance in the regions that they recruit, 
along with the observation of differences between pToM and ToM, suggest that participants 
relied on different cognitive mechanisms to carry out the two ToM tasks. This finding is all the 
more remarkable given that the two ToM conditions involved identical task instructions and 
differed only in terms of familiarity with the target person and, in some cases the setting depicted 
in the photos. As expected, relative to ToM, pToM engaged midline regions that closely 
resembled those involved in AM during both the early and late phase of event generation. In 
contrast, ToM versus pToM recruited a more lateral set of regions known to be involved in 
semantic memory during the late phase of event generation (Martin & Chao, 2001). The greater 
involvement of the left ventrolateral PFC during ToM along with lateral temporal activity may 
reflect participants’ reliance on social scripts and general knowledge about the world in order to 
infer the mental states of unfamiliar others. This may include rules for understanding how the 
average person is likely to experience and respond to different situations and events (rather than 
relying on specific AMs or idiosyncratic representations). Greater occipital activity also emerged 
63 
 
during ToM versus pToM (and AM), which may reflect greater reliance on the visual 
information presented in the photos (e.g., facial expression, the spatial relations between the 
people in the photo) in order to construct the novel ToM events and to infer the mental states of 
unfamiliar others. Participants likely employ these types of strategies when carrying out standard 
laboratory tests of ToM. This idea is supported by the finding that patients with semantic 
dementia and impaired semantic memory perform poorly on a variety of laboratory tests of ToM 
(Duval et al., 2012). 
Differences Between AM Versus pToM 
 
Despite the clear correspondence between AM and pToM, the second LV (LV2) in the 
analysis that included all three experimental conditions differentiated a set of regions supporting 
AM from a separate set of regions supporting pToM. This LV revealed very few neural 
differences during the early phase of event generation, but as the events continued to unfold over 
time, more widespread differences emerged. The failure to find robust differences between AM 
and pToM during the early phase of event generation in LV2, along with the similarities revealed 
in LV1, suggest that the processes supporting AM and pToM are most similar during the initial 
construction of events. As mentioned above, it is possible that this shared activity early on 
represents reliance on past experiences during both AM and pToM. However, in the AM 
condition the recollection is conscious, whereas in the pToM condition this process is likely 
automatic given that participants were told to generate novel events without resorting to specific 
past memories. 
During the latter part of event generation, relative to pToM, AM was associated with 
greater activity within the right posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (BA 23/31); at a slightly 
relaxed threshold (BSR > 2.4, p < .05), activity within the medial PFC (BA 10) and 
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paracingulate cortex (BA 32) was also present. This pattern of activity likely reflects self-
referential and visuospatial aspects of autobiographical remembering that have been identified in 
previous studies (Addis, Moscovitch, Crawley, & McAndrews, 2004; Fletcher et al., 1995; 
Gilboa et al., 2004; Rosenbaum, Ziegler, Winocur, Grady, & Moscovitch, 2004; Summerfield, 
Hassabis, & Maguire, 2009; Svoboda et al., 2006).  
In contrast to AM, the regions engaged to a greater extent during pToM are consistent 
with those reported in the ToM literature and include the right frontal pole (BA 10), bilateral 
dorsomedial PFC (BA 9), bilateral ventrolateral PFC, left insula, bilateral lateral temporal 
regions, left temporal pole (BA 38), and bilateral middle occipital cortex (BA 18/19; Amodio & 
Frith, 2006; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Spreng et al., 2009). The involvement of the left 
ventrolateral PFC and lateral temporal regions suggest greater reliance on general semantic 
processing during pToM relative to AM (Martin & Chao, 2001). It is likely that imagining a 
novel event that has never occurred requires increased generative processing relative to 
retrieving a past event from memory (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009). Furthermore, 
previous work has identified the anterior temporal cortex as a region important for representing 
social knowledge (for reviews, see Olson et al., 2007; Simmons & Martin, 2009). The left 
temporal pole, in particular, has been characterized as a storehouse for personal semantic 
memories and is thought to be responsible for linking high-level sensory representations, such as 
familiar faces, with semantic information (Olson et al., 2007). 
Some of the differences observed between AM and pToM during the latter part of event 
generation may relate to differences between remembering actual events and constructing events 
from imagination. Therefore, the greater midline activity observed during AM versus pToM (at a 
BSR > 2.4) may reflect differences in the ‘realness’ of events. This interpretation converges with 
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recent work showing greater medial PFC and posterior cingulate cortex activity during the 
recollection of personally experienced events relative to events that were previously imagined 
but not experienced (Summerfield et al., 2009). Based on these findings, it was suggested that 
midline regions may help to distinguish actual experiences from imagined ones (Hassabis, 
Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007). A related explanation to account for the differences between AM 
and pToM is that the conditions vary with respect to personal significance, with AM events most 
relevant, followed by pToM events. Therefore, it may be the combination of ‘realness’ and 
personal significance that explains the greater activity within medial frontal, paracingulate, and 
medial parietal regions during AM versus pToM. Though conceivable, this was not reflected in 
hippocampal activity, which would have been expected to differ based on previous work 
showing that activity in this region is modulated by personal significance (Addis et al., 2004). 
Alternatively, the increased midline activity, particularly the precuneus, during AM 
versus pToM may reflect the greater visual detail with which AM events were recollected. 
Although vividness was equated across all three conditions (using within-scanner ratings), 
participants did, in fact, generate significantly more internal details for the AM versus pToM and 
ToM events during the postscan interview. Therefore, it is possible that participants made their 
vividness ratings relative to events within a condition rather than across all conditions. If so, the 
increased number of details generated for the AM events may represent more vividly generated 
events. 
Theoretical Implications 
 
In the context of the current set of fMRI results, the common core network supporting 
AM and ToM involving personally familiar and unfamiliar people may reflect an interplay 
between AM and semantic memory. This idea is consistent with the transformation hypothesis, 
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whereby a dynamic interplay exists between AM for vivid contextual details of a personally 
experienced event, supported by the hippocampus, and semanticized versions of the original 
memory, supported by the neocortex (Winocur et al., 2010; see also Moscovitch et al., 2005, 
2006; Rosenbaum et al., 2001). Similar to the transformation hypothesis, Spreng and Mar (2012) 
recently proposed that the shared network supporting AM and ToM reflects a distributed 
integration zone that provides a means for past personal experience to transform into social 
conceptual knowledge, knowledge that is then used to guide social processes and behaviour. 
Building on these ideas, I suggest that AM and semantic memory work together to 
support ToM abilities (at least in healthy people). The extent to which each memory system is 
involved will depend on whose mind one is inferring in addition to the processing demands of 
the task at hand and the social–perceptual cues that are available. ToM involving unfamiliar 
others, whether in the laboratory or real world, is likely to rely more heavily on semantic or 
schematic memory, whereas ToM involving well-known others is more likely to rely on AM. 
The capacity to readily access semantic and autobiographical information about personally 
known others likely sets the stage for successful social interactions with people with whom we 
have close relationships. However, in the face of AM loss, the semantic memory system is likely 
sufficient for successful performance on standard laboratory measures of ToM (Rosenbaum et 
al., 2007) and possibly real-world ToM tests involving unfamiliar people, such as the one used 
here. It remains to be determined whether AM is critical for real-world ToM processes that 
involve personally familiar others. Taken together, the current results suggest that ToM is not 
solved by a single strategy but rather a flexible set of mechanisms that call upon 
autobiographical episodic memory and semantic memory representations to varying extents, 
depending, in part, on the level of familiarity with the subject of the mental state inference. 
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Conclusion 
 
In sum, the current study suggests that there are multiple routes to ToM that involve some 
balance between autobiographical episodic memory and semantic memory among other 
processes. The particular strategy adopted likely depends on one's relationship with the target 
person and the type of social knowledge gained through past experiences with that person. This 
in turn, interacts with one's current goals and the cues or processing resources available to make 
the inference. These findings suggest that individuals engaging in ToM more readily draw on 
past personal experiences when reasoning about the mental states of personally familiar others 
and on semantic memory or script-like social knowledge when inferring the mental states of 
unfamiliar others, although both types of processes are likely at play in healthy people. ToM 
tasks that involve personally familiar others may better reflect ToM abilities as they occur in the 
real world and highlight the need for more ecologically valid ToM paradigms. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Experiment 3: Imagining Other People’s Experiences in a Person With 
Impaired Autobiographical Episodic Memory: The Role of Personal 
Familiarity 
 
The results of Experiment 2 revealed that healthy individuals more readily draw on past 
personal experiences mediated by the hippocampus to infer the experiences of personally known 
others (i.e., family members and friends) compared to unknown others. This suggests that the 
hippocampus is preferentially involved in imagining personally known others’ experiences, but 
leaves unanswered whether it is needed to do so. To address this question, I assessed whether 
H.C., a person with hippocampal amnesia of developmental origin and impaired AM, is able to 
imagine events experienced by personally known others. 
In the current study, I employed the same family photos test used in Experiment 2, which 
required participants to describe the experiences of other people in response to photos of 
personally known others (i.e., relatives and close friends; pToM condition) and unknown others 
(ToM condition) as well as recollect past experiences in response to personal photos (AM 
condition). This naturalistic task was selected because it is less constrained than most standard 
tests of ToM and therefore better captures ToM as it occurs in everyday life. Findings of 
impaired pToM that parallel H.C.’s AM deficit would suggest that pToM relies on AM or that a 
common process mediates both abilities. Alternatively, it may be the case that intact aspects of 
H.C.’s semantic memory are sufficient to support mental state inferences involving pToM and 
ToM, and therefore H.C. would show intact performance on both tasks, similar to her 
performance on standard ToM tests (see Experiment 1). 
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Method 
 
Participants 
 
 H.C.’s performance was compared with the same sample used in Experiment 2. That is, 
18 right-handed, healthy women with normal or corrected-to- normal vision and no reported 
history of neurological or psychiatric illness participated in the study (mean age =19.3 years, SD 
= 1.2; mean education = 13.3 years, SD =1.1). All participants gave informed written consent in 
accordance with the ethics committees at York University and Baycrest. Participants received 
monetary compensation for their time. 
Stimuli 
 
I employed the same naturalistic test of ToM used in Experiment 2 (see Experiment 2 for 
a full description of the task). Following the scan, participants took part in an interview in which 
they viewed the same photos that had been presented in the scanner. Participants were asked to 
think back to the events that they had generated in the scanner and to rate each event on the same 
three scales that had been presented in the scanner. The photos with the highest vividness ratings 
(approximately two-thirds of all photos) were selected for a semistructured interview in which 
participants described the events as they had been imagined/recollected in the scanner. It should 
be noted that during Session 2 H.C. was interviewed on all of the photos presented during the 
scan as well as eight additional AM events, which had not been presented in the scanner, in order 
to increase power. There was no time limit for participants to describe the events, and 
participants continued with their descriptions until they came to a natural ending point. 
Participants were then provided with a single, standardized probe to elicit additional details (e.g., 
“Can you tell me anything else?”). The events were recorded and transcribed for later scoring. 
Control participants were tested on the family photos paradigm once, whereas H.C was tested on 
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the paradigm on two separate occasions for reliability purposes. The two testing sessions took 
place three years apart. The AM events that were included during H.C.’s first testing session 
were excluded because it was subsequently learned that she frequently views these photos. 
Adapted Autobiographical Interview Scoring Procedure  
 
Narratives were scored using an adapted Autobiographical Interview scoring procedure 
developed by Levine and colleagues (2002; see Appendix A for example scoring).  The 
Autobiographical Interview was developed to quantify episodic and semantic contributions to 
AMs, but has been successfully employed in a number of studies examining non-mnemonic 
abilities, such as future thinking (Addis et al., 2008; Kwan et al., 2010) and describing pictures 
of scenes (Race et al., 2011). The pToM, ToM, and AM narratives were first segmented into 
distinct details, which were classified as internal (e.g., event-specific, temporal, perceptual, 
spatial, and thought/emotion details) or external (i.e., semantic facts that were irrelevant to the 
central event, repetitions, and metacognitive statements). Given the use of visually rich photos as 
cues, it was important to ensure that participants’ performance was not inflated due to merely 
describing the details depicted in the photos (i.e., describing exactly what participants see in the 
photo). Therefore, internal details were further classified as either descriptive (i.e., details that 
describe the visual content of the photo) or elaborative (i.e., details that go beyond what is 
literally depicted in the photo). The criteria developed to classify details as either descriptive or 
elaborative are presented in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1 
Classification of Descriptive Versus Elaborative Details for the Autobiographical Interview 
 
 
Type of detail              Descriptive details Elaborative details 
 
 
Event 
 
Any detail referring to an action that is 
depicted in the photo (e.g., sitting, walking, 
standing, posing for the photo) 
 
 
Any detail describing an action that 
is not obvious from the photo  
 
Character 
 
 
Any detail explaining who the people are in 
the photo (only for the pToM and AM 
conditions) 
 
 
Any detail referring to the 
relationships between people 
depicted in the photos (only for the 
ToM condition) 
 
 
Temporal 
 
Season (depending on the information 
presented in the photo) 
 
Details referring to a specific time 
period (e.g., year, month, date, day 
of week) 
 
 
Perceptual 
 
Perceptual details that are depicted in the 
photo (e.g., big crowd of people, candles 
everywhere) 
 
Describing or naming an object, monument 
or statue that is depicted in the photo (e.g., 
statue of liberty) 
 
 
Perceptual details that are not visible 
in the photo 
 
Emotion/Thought 
 
Any detail describing a facial expression 
(e.g., smiling, frowning) 
 
 
Any detail describing an emotion or 
mental state (e.g., happy, sad, tired) 
 
 
Spatial/Place 
 
Any detail describing a location (e.g., 
country, city, street, location within a room) 
that can be inferred from information 
presented in the photo (e.g., sign)  
 
Any detail describing a location 
(e.g., country, city, street, location 
within a room) that is not apparent 
from information depicted in the 
photo 
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Analyses of the narratives were conducted by a trained rater who achieved high interrater 
reliability on the Autobiographical Interview (intraclass correlation coefficient, two-way random 
effects model; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) using a standard set of previously scored memories 
(Levine et al., 2002). Interrater reliability was also calculated for the elaborative and descriptive 
details based on criteria developed by JSR (see Table 4.1). Intraclass correlation analyses 
indicated high agreement among scorers for pToM (Cronbach’s α = .994), ToM (Cronbach’s α = 
.992), and AM events (Cronbach’s α = .994). 
 Data were analyzed using a modified t-test procedure, which compares test scores of a 
single patient to that of a small control sample (Crawford & Howell, 1998). Two-tailed t-tests 
were used to compare H.C.’s performance with that of controls on the pToM and ToM 
conditions, whereas a one-tailed t-test was used for the AM condition given a priori hypotheses 
regarding H.C.’s AM performance. Like other case studies reported in the literature, values 
associated with p < .05 were considered to be significant (Bowles et al., 2007; Hassabis, 
Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Hurley et al., 2011; Levine, Svoboda, Turner, Mandic, & 
Mackey, 2009; Maguire et al., 2010; Rosenbaum et al., 2008, 2009), and values associated with p 
< .09 were considered to be trends (Rosenbaum et al, 2009). Given the low statistical power 
associated with case studies, this level of correction provides a desirable balance between type I 
and type II error rates. Effect sizes (zcc) and 95% confidence intervals on the effect sizes are 
reported (Crawford, Garthwaite, & Porter, 2010).  
Results 
 
As mentioned above, H.C. was tested on two separate occasions. For completeness, I 
reported the data separately for the two testing sessions. Each control participant contributed an 
average of 8.9 pToM events (SD = 0.72), 9.1 ToM events (SD = 0.9), and 9.3 AM events (SD = 
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0.49) to the analyses. In Session 1, H.C. contributed 7 pToM events and 9 ToM events to the 
analyses. In Session 2, H.C. contributed 15 pToM events, 12 ToM events, and 18 AM events to 
the analyses. 
Phenomenology of the pToM, ToM, and AM Events 
 
 Participants’ postscan ratings were entered into the analyses (as opposed to the within-
scanner ratings) as these were believed to better correspond with the events described by 
participants during the postscan interview. Table 4.2 presents participants’ ratings of the pToM, 
ToM, and AM events. In terms of vividness, H.C. rated the pToM events in Session 1 as less 
vivid than that of controls, t(17) = -2.50, p = .023, zCC = -2.57 [-3.54, -1.59]; there was no 
difference for the pToM events in Session 2, t(17) = -0.81, p = .43, zCC = -0.83[-1.36, -0.29]. 
With respect to the ToM events, vividness ratings did not differ between H.C. and controls for 
Session 1, t(17) = -1.10, p = .29, zCC  = -1.13 [-1.71, -0.52] or for Session 2, t(17) = -1.52, p = 
.15, zCC  = -1.56 [-2.25, -0.86]. For the AM events, H.C.’s ratings were significantly less vivid 
than that of controls, t(17) = -3.09, p = .003, zCC  = -3.17 [-4.32, -2.01]. In terms of the ratings 
assessing likeness to an actual memory, no significant differences emerged between H.C. and 
controls for the pToM and ToM events in Sessions 1 or 2 [pToM Session 1 and Session 2, t(17) 
= -1.35, p = .19, zCC  = -1.39 [-2.03, -0.73], and t(17) = -0.34, p = .74, zCC  = -0.35 [-0.82, 0.13], 
respectively, and ToM Session 1 and Session 2, t(17) = -0.52, p = .61, zCC  = -0.53 [-1.02, -0.03], 
and t(17) = -0.52, p = .61, zCC  = -0.53 [-1.01, -0.03]. Finally, as expected, H.C.’s ratings relating 
to the recollection of AM events were significantly lower than that of controls, t(17) = -9.25, p < 
.00001, zCC = -9.50 [-12.69,  -6.30]. 
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Table 4.2 
 
Phenomenological Qualities of the Generated pToM, ToM, and AM Events 
 
   
                               pToM                             ToM                               AM   
  
 
Vividness (/4)        
    H.C. session 1                2.14*                    2.67                                   -- 
    H.C. session 2                           2.87                      2.50                                2.83* 
    Controls                 3.22 (0.42)                3.11 (0.39)                     3.56 (0.23) 
 
Remember/Know (/3)   
     H.C. session 1                 --                                 --                               -- 
     H.C. session 2                            --                   --                2.61*  
     Controls                                     --                   --                            2.99 (0.04)    
   
Similar to a Memory (/4) 
     H.C. session 1               2.71                    3.3                    -- 
     H.C. session 2                         3.27                3.3                    --  
     Controls                                  3.46 (0.54)                  3.56 (0.49)                        -- 
 
The number in parentheses in the left-hand column indicates the maximum score for each rating scale. 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses; pToM, personal theory of mind; ToM, theory of mind; AM, 
autobiographical memory.  
*p < .05 
 
Adapted Autobiographical Interview Results 
 
 Given the use of visually rich photos as cues, I was most interested in the elaborative 
details that participants generated. I analyzed the data in two ways. First, I compared the average 
number of elaborative details H.C. and controls produced in response to each pToM, ToM, and 
AM event. These absolute numbers, however, are confounded by participants’ total verbal 
output. In order to overcome this issue, I also calculated the proportion of elaborative-to-total 
internal details, which provides an unbiased quantification of details. It also serves as an index of 
the weight given to descriptive versus elaborative details. 
 The average number of elaborative details produced by participants in response to each 
pToM, ToM, and AM event is shown in Figure 4.1. Due to the small number of elaborative 
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details produced for each narrative, I was unable to make meaningful comparisons when the 
details were further divided into the internal detail categories (i.e., event, place, time, perceptual, 
thought/emotion). In response to the pToM events, H.C. produced significantly fewer elaborative 
details than controls during Session 1, t( 17) = -3.10, p = .007, zCC = -3.18 [-4.33, -2.02], and 
there was a trend towards impaired performance during Session 2, t(17) = -1.84, p = .083, zCC =   
-1.89 [-2.6, -1.10]. In terms of the ToM events, no significant differences emerged for Session 1, 
t( 17) = -1.60, p = .13, zCC = -1.64 [-2.35,  -0.92], or Session 2, t( 17) = -0.97, p = .35, zCC = -0.99 
[-1.55,  -0.42]. With respect to the AM events, as expected, H.C. produced significantly fewer 
elaborative details than did controls, t(17) = -1.76, p = .049, zCC = -1.80 [-2.55, -1.04].   
 
 
Figure 4.1. The Mean Number of Elaborative Details Generated in Response to Each pToM, ToM, and 
AM Event. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
*p < .08; **p < .05.   
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 The proportion of elaborative-to-total-internal details produced by participants in 
response to each pToM, ToM, and AM event is presented in Figure 4.2. Analyses revealed that 
H.C. produced a lower proportion of elaborative details (and therefore more descriptive details) 
than controls in response to the pToM events during both Session 1, t(17) = -7.08, p < .00001, 
zCC = -7.27 [-9.73, -4.80], and Session 2, t(17) = -5.03, p = .0001, zCC = -5.18 [-6.95, -3.39]. In 
contrast, H.C. and controls produced an equivalent proportion of elaborative details in response 
to the ToM events during both Session 1, t(17) = 0.78, p = .45, zCC = 0.80 [0.26, 1.33] and 
Session 2, t(17) = -0.31, p = .76, zCC = -0.32 [-0.79, 0.16] . As predicted, H.C. generated a lower 
proportion of elaborative details relative to controls in response to the AM events, t(17) =  -2.66, 
p = .008, zCC = -2.70 [-3.70, -1.70].  
 
  
Figure 4.2. The Mean Proportion of Elaborative-to-Total Internal Details Generated in Response to Each 
pToM, ToM, and AM Event. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
*p < .01; **p < .0001.  
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Figure 4.3. Representative Samples of the pToM, ToM, and AM Narratives Provided by H.C. and a 
Control Participant.  
 
 
pToM involving familiar others 
H.C.: That is my cousin and my uncle, so her dad, and I would assume that they went on a big marathon 
and they had just finished, and that's why my uncle looks really tired and he looks really happy. 
  
Representative Control: Aunty Debra just drove Michelle to school in Kingston, and she’s really sad to 
see Michelle go because Michelle’s growing up now, and she said ‘You’re so grown up’. And 
Michelle’s like, ‘Don’t worry, I’ll be fine’ and Auntie Debra says, ‘I know, but this is a huge change for 
me’ and all that stuff. And then she says bye and then when Michelle turns around, she’s secretly happy 
that she’s leaving her mother. 
  
ToM involving unfamiliar others 
H.C.: I imagined they were in Australia because I think that's where koala bears are from and she was 
trying to convince her mother who was the one was taking the photo. And I was imagining she was 
trying to convince her mother to let her take the koala bear home. It looks like she really wants it. 
 
Representative Control: This dad and his two sons went apple picking and he’s like ‘Okay follow me 
guys’. Then they go on a path less traveled. The dad ends up losing his bearings and getting lost a little 
bit, and his sons realize that they’re lost and they’re like ‘Oh no, we’re lost’. The dad finds his way back 
and the kids keep on asking ‘Dad are you lost?’ and he’s like ‘Of course not’. And then the dad finally 
finds his way back and he’s like ‘phew’. 
 
 AM 
H.C.: That's in Florida. That was at my Aunt Jill’s… my Aunt Jill and Uncle Bill had a place in Florida 
so that was in the pool at their like resort condo sort of place, and that was the second pool I went to 
because that one was warmer because it was a little shallower. 
  
Control: That is my grandparents' wedding anniversary. I was thinking about the fact that it was also my 
18th birthday. I wasn't particularly pleased to be there, but my Aunt turned up. I hadn't realized that she 
was going to be coming all the way from Germany. So at that point when the photo was taken, she had 
just come in and I was really relieved. She had turned up, and I was glad that I came. I also thought 
about saying a ridiculously long speech about my grandparents that I had to have memorized. And yeah, 
that was their wedding anniversary. 
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Discussion 
 
 H.C., a developmental amnesic person with bilateral hippocampal damage, was impaired 
at imagining the experiences of personally known others, which resembles her compromised 
ability to recall past experiences via AM. These impairments stand in contrast to her preserved 
ability to imagine the experiences of unknown others. This pattern of results held whether we 
analyzed the average number of elaborative details (i.e., details that go beyond what is visually 
depicted in the photo) or the proportion of elaborative-to-total-internal details in order to control 
for verbal output. These results bolster the finding that different neural and cognitive 
mechanisms support thinking about personally known versus unknown others and that the former 
may depend on processes mediated by the hippocampus and AM.  
 The idea that individuals rely on past personal experiences to infer and simulate another 
person’s mental state has been suggested by philosophers and cognitive neuroscientists alike 
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Corcoran, 2000, 2001; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Spreng & Mar, 
2012). However, the current findings indicate that reliance on past personal experiences may be 
pivotal only when imagining the experiences and mental states of personally known others. 
Indeed, knowing an individual for a long period of time and observing that person’s behaviour in 
different situations provides a rich source of information from which one can draw when 
imagining that person’s mental states in various situations. Consistent with this interpretation, 
Krienen and colleagues (2010) showed that participants reported that they relied on a specific 
memory or anecdote significantly more often when making judgments relating to friends relative 
to strangers. In another study, Ciaramelli and colleagues (2013) found that participants’ level of 
empathy for a familiar character was modulated by the retrieval of previous episodes involving 
that character. Additional support for this idea is provided by the neuroimaging results in 
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Experiment 2, which revealed that the pattern of neural activity supporting pToM shares more in 
common with AM than with ToM. Notably, the greatest degree of neural overlap between pToM 
and AM was observed within midline regions, particularly within the hippocampus and related 
MTL structures. 
 Reliance on past personal experiences to infer personally familiar others’ mental states 
may occur with or without one’s intention or awareness. Indeed, there is accumulating evidence 
that AM supported by the hippocampus can rapidly and automatically influence one’s 
performance on non-mnemonic tasks (Greenberg et al., 2009; Sheldon & Moscovitch, 2010; 
Westmacott, Black, Freedman, & Moscovitch, 2004; Westmacott & Moscovitch, 2003). Gobbini 
and Haxby (2007) suggest that the mere perception of a familiar individual is associated with the 
spontaneous retrieval of personal knowledge about that individual (i.e., personal traits, attitudes, 
biographical facts, and AMs), which may then help to better understand and predict what that 
person is thinking and/or feeling. These automatic processes may have been at play in the current 
study given that participants were instructed not to refer to past episodes when generating the 
pToM and ToM events. It is possible that participants engaged in inhibitory processes to help 
overcome the prepotent tendency to rely on past memories. Alternatively, other memory 
regulation processes such as thought substitution (Benoit & Anderson, 2012) may have been 
employed. 
 Another possible explanation for H.C.’s corresponding impairment in both AM and 
pToM may relate to a deficit in (re)constructing specific episodes. Accumulating evidence from 
neuroimaging studies suggests that imagining specific versus general past and future events 
elicits greater activity within the hippocampus (Addis, Cheng, Roberts, & Schacter, 2011; 
Henessy Ford, Addis, & Giovanello, 2011; Holland, Addis, & Kensinger, 2011), likely due to the 
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greater relational processing that is required for the former (Addis et al.,  2011). Several theories 
propose that individuals are more likely to imagine close others with greater specificity relative 
to unknown others, which are typically represented in more generic and abstract terms 
(Lieberman, 2012; Liviatan, Trope, & Liberman, 2008). This may be because individuals possess 
idiosyncratic theories about close others’ personalities that enable one to richly imagine how 
well-known others would respond in various scenarios and situations (Lieberman, 2012). 
Therefore H.C.’s difficulty in generating specific details may account for her poor performance 
on the AM and pToM conditions. 
 It may be the case that for the pToM events H.C. attempted to rely on a strategy that is 
optimal for people who are able to conjure up contextual and specific details rather than relying 
on a strategy that would be advantageous for her. Like controls, H.C. may have been engaging in 
inhibitory processes of past events when generating the pToM and ToM events. However, 
because her autobiographical recollection is impaired, she may have generalized this instruction 
to personal semantic information, which would have likely helped her to generate additional 
details for the pToM events. Perhaps, if she had been probed in a manner that enabled her to 
draw more effectively on her intact personal or social semantic memory, she may have 
performed better on the pToM task. Indeed, different methods of cuing can differentially affect 
task performance. H.C., for instance, was impaired at imagining herself in future episodes when 
provided with a specific cue word (e.g., “coffee”; Kwan et al., 2010) but showed intact 
performance when a more general and nonspecific cue was provided (e.g., “Imagine something 
you will be doing this weekend”; Hurley et al., 2011; for similar findings in developmental 
amnesia see Cooper et al., 2011).  
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 The corresponding deficit that emerged during AM and pToM is unlikely to be due to a 
deficit in narrative construction, given that H.C. had no difficulty constructing narratives in 
response to the ToM photos. This pattern of results is consistent with those from a recent study 
showing that the ability to generate a detailed narrative is preserved in adult-onset amnesia (Race 
et al., 2011; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2013; cf. Rosenbaum et al., 2009). Although the patients 
in the study by Race and colleagues (2011) produced impoverished descriptions of past and 
future events, they showed intact performance when asked to tell a story in response to pictures 
depicting fictional characters. It is important to note that while the participants were instructed to 
generate a story rather than to report what was literally depicted in the picture, to our knowledge, 
the authors did not examine whether participants adhered to this instruction. In the current study, 
when examining the extent to which participants relied on the visual content of the photos to 
generate details, approximately half of the details H.C. produced for the pToM events consisted 
of descriptive details (vs. 12.5% for controls). The current findings highlight the importance of 
examining descriptive versus elaborative details when rich visual cues are used.  
 H.C.’s impairment in AM and pToM contrasts with her preserved ability to imagine the 
experiences of unknown others during ToM. The latter finding is consistent with her intact 
performance on a wide range of standard ToM tests that employ strangers or fictional characters 
as targets (See Experiment 1 and Rosenbaum et al., 2007). Imagining the experiences of 
unfamiliar others may be achieved by relying on social semantic memory, which remains 
relatively intact in H.C. This might include reliance on generic representations about how the 
average person is expected to think and feel in a given situation (Lieberman, 2012). Generic 
representations are likely based on routines or schemas that are already bound together and 
therefore require minimal relational processing. The fMRI findings from Experiment 2 support 
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this interpretation. Using the same family photos paradigm employed here, I showed that relative 
to pToM, ToM involving unfamiliar others elicited greater activity in lateral regions known to be 
associated with accessing semantic knowledge (Martin & Chao, 2001). Taken together, these 
data further corroborate the notion that AM may be needed for social cognition, but that its role 
may be specific to imagining the experiences of personally known others, and may not be 
necessary for imagining the experiences of unknown others.  
 The use of an open-ended ToM task allowed us to gain insight into possible 
compensatory strategies that H.C. employed when taking the perspective of another person. H.C. 
generated a significantly greater proportion of descriptive details in response to the pToM photos 
than did controls, suggesting that she relied more heavily on the visual information depicted in 
the photos to imagine the experiences of personally known others. This may have included 
relying on the familiar others’ facial expressions, body language, and/or the relative spatial 
relations between people. This strategy may serve her well in social settings when external cues 
are readily available but may fail when external cues are absent or when situations are complex 
and require the integration of information from the past and present. For example, H.C. may 
have difficulty considering the mental states of people who are not currently present or 
predicting a person’s reaction to a situation that has not yet occurred.  
 H.C.’s performance on the pToM condition was not at floor which indicates that her 
ability to imagine the experiences of personally familiar others is impaired but not entirely 
absent. In fact, approximately 50% of the details she generated in response to the pToM events 
were elaborative details (i.e., details that go beyond what is literally depicted in the photo). 
However, upon closer examination, even the qualitative nature of the elaborative details she 
generated differed from that of controls. Specifically, H.C.’s responses tended to reflect more 
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basic emotional states that could be inferred from the visual features of the photo, such as 
“they’re both really excited” or “she looks really happy.” In contrast, control participants 
typically provided more complex mental state inferences such as “they were probably afraid but 
they are trying to look cool” and “her mother was pleased that her daughter was having so much 
fun” (see Figure 4.3 for narrative samples).  
 H.C. generated a greater number of elaborative details in response to the pToM and ToM 
events during Session 2 relative to Session 1. It is important to note, however, that the overall 
pattern remained consistent over the two testing sessions in that H.C. produced fewer elaborative 
details for the pToM versus ToM events within each session. It is possible that the difference 
across testing sessions reflects a practice effect resulting from experience with narrative 
generation. Although our two testing sessions took place three years apart, H.C. participated in 
several other studies during that time that required her to generate detailed narratives (Hurley et 
al., 2011; Kwan et al., 2010). In fact, within these other studies, H.C. showed improved 
performance on tests of future imagining over testing sessions (Hurley et al., 2011; Kwan et al. 
2010). A related explanation for H.C.’s higher scores during Session 2 may be due to the fact 
that she learned to use a more effective strategy that enabled her to generate a greater number of 
details.   
It should be noted that I did not confirm the accuracy of participants’ reported memories. 
However, anecdotal evidence provided by H.C.’s family suggests that she tends to fill in memory 
gaps. Therefore, H.C.’s AM scores are likely an overestimate of her true AM capabilities. 
Furthermore, the Autobiographical Interview scoring procedure (Levine et al., 2002) states that 
any detail that could reasonably reflect episodic re-experiencing should be classified as internal. 
Levine and colleagues (2009) acknowledge that although this practice helps avoid subjective 
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judgments in scoring, it results in “episodic-like” details being classified as internal when 
episodic re-experiencing does not occur (Brewer, 1988). The authors recognize that this may 
occur in patients with impaired AM, who recall ‘episodic-like’ details that may be part of their 
personal semantic memory, and may also be the case with H.C. 
 In the current study, I attempted to control for vividness by including only the pToM, 
ToM, and AM events with the highest vividness ratings in the analyses. Nevertheless, the 
analyses revealed that H.C. rated the pToM events in Session 1 and the AM events in Session 2 
as less vivid than controls. Several other factors, such as personal significance, may have 
differed between H.C. and controls. It should be noted, however, that several researchers have 
argued that individuals with developmental amnesia likely do not know what it is like to truly 
remember or imagine an event in great detail. As a result, developmental amnesic individuals 
likely assign these types of ratings in a qualitatively different way compared to healthy 
individuals (Cooper et al., 2011; Mullally, Vargha-Khadem, & Maguire, 2014).  
 In conclusion, using an ecologically valid and naturalistic test of ToM, I formally show 
that AM supported by the hippocampus may be pivotal for imagining the experiences of 
personally familiar, but not unfamiliar others. The current findings complement the fMRI data 
reported in Experiment 2 and suggest that individuals are more likely to rely on AM when the 
target is personally familiar and on general social semantic memory when the target person is 
unknown. However, both types of memory are likely at play when healthy individuals engage in 
ToM. Continued research with H.C. and other amnesic individuals, particularly those that 
acquire damage later in life, is needed to better understand the role that AM plays in this and 
other aspects of social cognition.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Experiment 4: Activation of Hippocampal Tissue in Developmental Amnesia 
During Remembering and Imagining 
 
As noted previously, a recent topic of interest is whether the hippocampus, known for its 
role in AM, is also critical for imagining novel events (for reviews on this topic see Schacter, 
2012; Schacter et al., 2012). Evidence supporting this idea comes from a variety of empirical 
approaches. For instance, neuroimaging studies show that both remembering and imagining rely 
on an overlapping set of brain regions that includes the hippocampus (Addis et al., 2007; Rabin 
et al., 2010; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Spreng et al., 2009). Similarly, neuropsychological studies 
demonstrate that amnesic patients with damage to the hippocampus show a parallel deficit in 
remembering the past and imagining novel events (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007; Klein 
et al., 2002; Kwan et al., 2010; Race et al., 2011; Tulving, 1985). For example, Hassabis and 
colleagues (2007) found that four out of five amnesic individuals with bilateral hippocampal 
damage were significantly impaired at recalling past episodes and imagining new experiences. 
Specifically, the patients’ descriptions of past and novel events lacked spatial coherence, 
contained less content, and were more fragmented relative to control participants’ descriptions. 
Although previous work has shown that hippocampal amnesic patients are impaired at 
imagining episodes, there are some patients who retain these abilities despite hippocampal 
damage and impaired remembering. For example, in the study by Hassabis and colleagues 
(2007) reported above, one of the patients (P01) could construct spatially coherent scenes and 
events. Similar findings of intact imagining have also been reported in a group of amnesic 
patients with bilateral hippocampal damage but spared remote memory (Squire, Horst, Mcduff, 
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Frascino, & Hopkins, 2010), and several developmental amnesic individuals, including the well-
known case Jon (Cooper et al., 2010; Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, & Hassabis, 2010). 
A question that has recently received a great deal of attention is how these seemingly 
inconsistent patient findings can be resolved (Mullally, Hassabis, & Maguire, 2012; Mullally et 
al., 2014; Schacter et al., 2012). Two possible explanations have been put forth. One possibility 
is that intact imagining in these amnesic patients may be due to reliance on compensatory 
strategies that are supported by extrahippocampal regions. This idea has been proposed in several 
studies (Cooper et al., 2011; Maguire et al., 2010); however, the most direct evidence for this 
idea comes from a recent fMRI study with the developmental case, Jon (Mullally et al., 2014). In 
that study, Jon was scanned with fMRI as he constructed and imagined various scenes (e.g., 
standing on a crowded platform of a train station). The authors found that Jon activated many of 
the regions known to be associated with scene construction, such as the ventromedial PFC, 
posterior cingulate cortex, retrosplenial cortex, and posterior parietal regions. Critically, 
however, Jon did not activate his remaining hippocampal tissue. Based on these findings, the 
authors suggested that in order to imagine scenes Jon is likely relying on his preserved semantic 
memory and intact reasoning abilities.  
Another possible explanation for preserved imagining abilities in some amnesic 
individuals is that there may be residual hippocampal tissue that is functional and sufficient to 
support imagining but not remembering. Evidence in favour of this hypothesis comes from the 
adult-onset amnesic patient, P01, who retained the ability to construct novel scenes despite 
suffering from a dense amnesia and 50% hippocampal volume loss bilaterally. P01’s intact scene 
construction was accompanied by activation in his remaining right hippocampal tissue (Mullally 
et al., 2012). Additional evidence supporting this idea is provided by Jon who showed bilateral 
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hippocampal activation during the retrieval of a few detailed memories (Maguire et al., 2001). In 
addition to activating hippocampal regions, Jon showed a different pattern of functional 
connectivity compared with controls. Specifically, Jon failed to exhibit connectivity between the 
parahippocampal cortex and the hippocampus, but elicited greater connectivity between the 
retrosplenial cortex and hippocampus and between the retrosplenial cortex and medial frontal 
regions. These findings suggest that intact imagining abilities and even isolated instances of 
remembering in hippocampal amnesia may be attributed to functional remnant hippocampal 
tissue and possibly altered functional connectivity.  
To test between these possibilities, what is needed is a paradigm with closely matched 
conditions in which both intact and impaired imagining can be demonstrated in an amnesic 
person. The study described in Experiment 3 presents such an instance. In the present study, 
fMRI was used to examine the brain activation patterns and functional connectivity of H.C. 
during intact performance on the ToM condition and impaired performance on the AM and 
pToM conditions.  
If H.C. shows selective hippocampal activation during ToM, but not during AM and 
pToM, it would indicate that the hippocampus is functional and sufficient to support ToM. 
Alternatively, if H.C. does not activate the hippocampus across any of the three conditions, it 
would suggest that extrahippocampal regions are sufficient for supporting ToM, but not AM and 
pToM. A final possibility is that H.C. would demonstrate hippocampal activation across all three 
conditions despite dissociations in behavioural performance, which would indicate that her 
hippocampal activation is nonspecific and likely does not represent functionally beneficial 
activity. In addition, it is well established that brain regions do not operate in isolation, but rather 
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as coherent networks. Therefore, I also examined whether different patterns of functional 
connectivity support H.C.’s intact versus impaired performance. 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
A detailed description of H.C. is provided earlier in this dissertation (see Experiment 3) 
and elsewhere (Kwan et al., 2010; Olsen et al., 2013; Rosenbaum et al., 2011). H.C.’s 
performance was compared with that of the same sample used in Experiment 3 (i.e., 18-
demographically matched women). As mentioned previously, all participants gave informed 
written consent in accordance with the ethics committees at York University and Baycrest. 
Participants received monetary compensation for their time. 
Task 
 
In the current experiment, I employed the same family photos test used in Experiment 2 
and therefore the task is only briefly described here (see Experiment 2 for a full description of 
the task). Participants were scanned with fMRI as they recollected past experiences in response 
to personal photos (AM condition) and imagined others’ experiences in response to photos of 
personally known others (pToM condition) and unknown others (ToM condition). All photos 
were presented for 20 seconds. Two control conditions were included in this study. One control 
condition consisted of luminance judgments made in response to scrambled photos, and the 
second consisted of an odd–even number judgment task. In the current study, only the latter 
control condition was used for the analyses, as this task does not elicit hippocampal activity 
(Stark & Squire, 2001). 
Following the presentation of each photo, participants rated the event they 
recollected/imagined on a number of dimensions known to influence neural activity. Three rating 
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scales were presented after each photo. For the first rating scale, AM events were rated on the 
extent to which events were recollected or familiar (Gardiner et al., 1998; Tulving, 1985), 
whereas imagined pToM and ToM events were rated for likeness to an actual memory. The other 
two rating scales were the same for all conditions. One assessed the amount of detail retrieved or 
imagined for each event and the other assessed the spatial coherence of each event (Hassabis, 
Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007). The responses from the 
spatial coherence scale are not reported in the current study, as participants had difficulty making 
these judgments.  
Postscan Interview 
 
Immediately following the scan, participants took part in an interview in which they 
viewed the same photos that had been presented in the scanner. Participants were asked to think 
back to the events they had generated in the scanner and to rate each event on the same three 
scales that had been presented in the scanner. The photos with the highest vividness ratings 
(approximately two-thirds of all photos) were selected for a semistructured interview in which 
participants described the events as they had been recollected or imagined in the scanner. The 
events were recorded and then transcribed for scoring. Narratives were scored using an adapted 
Autobiographical Interview scoring procedure (Levine et al., 2002). Given the use of visually 
rich photos as cues, we wanted to ensure that participants’ performance was not inflated due to 
merely describing the details depicted in the photos. Therefore, internal details were further 
classified as either descriptive (i.e., details that describe the visual content of the photo) or 
elaborative (i.e., details that go beyond what is literally depicted in the photo). The criteria 
developed to classify details as either descriptive or elaborative are presented in Table 4.1.  
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Control participants were tested on the family photos paradigm once, whereas H.C was 
tested on the paradigm on two separate occasions for reliability purposes. The two testing 
sessions took place three years apart. The AM events that were included during H.C.’s first 
testing session were excluded because it was subsequently learned that she frequently views and 
rehearses the events depicted in these photos. 
The results from the postscan interview are reported in Experiment 3. 
Data Acquisition and Preprocessing 
 
Brain imaging data were acquired with a Siemens Trio 3T magnet with a 12-channel head 
coil. Anatomical scans were acquired using a T1-weighted volumetric MRI (TR=2000 ms, 
TE=2.63 ms, 160 oblique axial slices, 1.0mm thick, FOV=256 mm). Functional scans were 
acquired with a whole-head T2*-weighted EPI pulse sequence (TR=2000 ms, TE=30 ms, flip 
angle=70°, FOV=200 mm, 64×64 acquisition matrix), consisting of 30 contiguous, 5-mm-thick 
axial slices. Physiological data (heart and respiration rate) were acquired during the scanning 
session. Stimuli were presented visually through a mirror mounted on a coil that reflected images 
from a projector located at the bottom of the scanner. Images were reconstructed and 
preprocessed with AFNI (Cox, 1996). The initial 10 time points of each run, in which transient 
signal changes occur as brain magnetization reaches a steady state, were excluded. The data were 
first corrected for respiration and heart rate. Next, slice-timing was corrected to the first slice. 
Motion correction was then performed by co-registering volumes to a reference EPI volume. The 
next several steps differed for the percent signal change analyses and the functional connectivity 
analyses.  
For the percent signal change analysis, volumes were normalized by the mean signal 
intensity in each voxel to reflect percent signal change. Time series were detrended to correct for 
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possible constant baseline drifts using a cubic polynomial. Events were modeled with a gamma 
hemodynamic response function that was applied when each photo appeared on the screen. Maps 
of brain activity were produced by fitting a general linear model to the measured fMRI time 
series at each voxel using the AFNI program 3dDeconvolve. Prior to group analyses, the 
activation maps for each participant were transformed into standardized spaces (Talairach & 
Tournoux, 1988), resampled at 2 mm × 2 mm × 2 mm, and spatially smoothed with an 8-mm 
FWHM Gaussian kernel. 
With respect to the functional connectivity analyses, following coregistration, the data 
were spatially smoothed with an 8-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel, transformed into 
standardized space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988), and resampled at 2 mm × 2 mm × 2 mm. 
Time series were detrended to correct for possible constant baseline drifts using a cubic 
polynomial.   
Data Analysis 
 Given that H.C. frequently forgot to make a button press demarcating the end of the 
construction phase and the beginning of the elaboration phase, events were collapsed across all 
time points for all participants. Data were analyzed using a modified t-test procedure, which 
compares test scores of a single patient to that of a small control sample (Crawford & Howell, 
1998). Following the rationale described in Experiment 3, two-tailed t tests were used to 
compare H.C.’s behavioural performance with that of controls on the pToM and ToM conditions, 
whereas a one-tailed t-test was used for the AM condition. In contrast, for the fMRI data, two-
tailed t tests were used to compare the neural activity between H.C. and that of controls across all 
three conditions. Like other case studies reported in the literature, values associated with p < .05 
were considered to be significant (Bowles et al., 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 
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2007; Hurley et al., 2011; Levine et al., 2009; Maguire et al., 2010; Rosenbaum et al., 2008, 
2009) and values associated with p < .09 were considered to be trends (Rosenbaum et al., 2009). 
Given the low statistical power associated with case studies, this level of correction provide a 
desirable balance between type I and type II error rates. Effect sizes (zcc) and 95% confidence 
intervals on the effect sizes are reported (Crawford, Garthwaite, & Porter, 2010). 
Percent signal change. 
 
For the data analysis, all AM, pToM, and ToM events were included, with the exception 
of two ToM events from one participant because she recognized the people in the photo and two 
pToM events from another participant due to technical difficulties. In addition, one AM event 
was excluded from two participants because the participants did not experience the events 
depicted in those AM photos.  
To determine whether there were significant differences in the pattern of activation 
supporting AM, pToM, and ToM in H.C. versus controls, a region of interest (ROI) analysis was 
performed. Percent signal change was calculated in relation to the control task (odd-even number 
judgment task). To ensure that regional measurements were made in an unbiased manner, the 
ROIs were selected from a conjunction analysis reported in a separate dataset examining AM and 
ToM (Rabin et al., 2010). The selected ROIs included the left medial PFC (-2 46 2), left 
ventrolateral PFC (-43 29 -1), left posterior cingulate cortex (PCC; -5 -56 21), right temporal 
pole (44 14 -26), and left temporal pole (-50 13 12). These ROIs were created by placing a 
sphere with an 8mm radius at the point of the peak activation.  
In addition to examining the above ROIs, I was also interested in examining differences 
in hippocampal activation between H.C. and controls. To do so, left and right hippocampal ROIs 
were created for each participant by manually tracing the hippocampus based on published 
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standardized guidelines (Pruessner et al., 2000). The tracings were performed by a trained rater 
(R. Olsen). 
Mean BOLD percent signal change was extracted from the ROIs for the AM, pToM, and 
ToM events for each participant. Only voxels that elicited percent signal change in a positive 
direction when compared with the control task (i.e., odd/even number judgments) were included. 
Differences in percent signal change between H.C. and the control group were calculated using a 
two-tailed modified t-test procedure (Crawford & Howell, 1998).  
fMRI analyses within H.C. 
 
To further explore the hippocampal activity observed in H.C. (see Results) and to 
determine whether this activation represents functionally relevant activity (Maguire et al, 2001), 
I carried out two analyses. The first analysis compared the BOLD signal associated with the AM 
events that H.C. rated as “remember” (9 AM events) with those she rated as “familiar” or “don’t 
know” (6 AM events). The second analysis compared the BOLD signal associated with the AM 
events that H.C. rated as vividly remembered (a vividness rating of 3 or 4, for a total of 7 AM 
events) versus the AM events she rated as vaguely remembered (a vividness rating of 1 or 2, for 
a total of 8 AM events). It was not possible to carry out the vivid versus vague contrast for the 
pToM and ToM events given that H.C. rated all of these events as vividly imagined (i.e., a 
vividness rating of 3 or 4). Because these analyses were computed on a single participant, a 
liberal threshold was employed, p < .01 (uncorrected) for the hippocampus (Maguire et al., 
2001). The rationale behind these analyses is that if the hippocampal activation observed in H.C. 
is functionally relevant then the activation should be greater for AM events that are 
“remembered” relative to those that are familiar/unknown (Maguire et al, 2001) and greater for 
AM events rated as vividly recollected versus those that are only vaguely recollected. 
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Functional connectivity analyses. 
 
In addition to examining percent signal change, functional connectivity was explored and 
the regional temporal correlations were compared between groups. Correlations were computed 
between the PCC (seed region) and other brain regions within the common core network for each 
of the three conditions. The PCC was selected as the seed region because: (a) it is considered the 
primary “hub” of both the AM and ToM networks (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010) and (b) it not 
known to be damaged in H.C. The same PCC ROI defined above (selected from Rabin et al., 
2010) was used as the seed region for the connectivity analyses (coordinate -5 -56 21). Note that 
this PCC ROI used here is very similar to the ROI employed by Andrews-Hanna and colleagues 
to examine default mode network connectivity. 
For each participant, the mean time course (i.e., collapsing across all time points) within 
the PCC seed region was extracted and Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated 
between the PCC seed and all voxels in the brain. Individual r-maps were transformed using 
Fisher’s z to yield normally distributed values. The mean correlation coefficients were then 
extracted for each defined ROI. The ROIs used here were the same as those used in the percent 
signal change analysis and included the left medial PFC, left ventrolateral PFC, left and right 
hippocampus, as well as left and right temporal poles.  
Results 
 
Phenomenology of the AM, pToM, and ToM Events 
 
As mentioned above, all AM, pToM and ToM events were included in the analyses. 
Within-scanner ratings were compared between H.C. and control participants to assess 
differences in the phenomenological quality of the AM, pToM, and ToM events. Table 5.1 
presents participants’ ratings.  
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Table 5.1 
 
Phenomenological Qualities of the Generated AM, pToM, and ToM Events 
 
  
                          AM                                pToM                        ToM   
  
 
Remember/Know (/3)   
     H.C. session 1                --                           --                       -- 
     H.C. session 2                       2.53**             --           --  
     Controls                                2.90(0.09)                       --                                --   
 
Similar to a Memory (/4) 
     H.C. session 1                --               3.2           3.33 
     H.C. session 2                          --           3.47           3.53  
     Controls                                   --             3.51(0.34)                    3.60(0.32)    
 
Vividness (/4)        
    H.C. session 1               --                2.73                               2.2* 
    H.C. session 2                        2.53*                 3.4                                 3.2 
    Controls              3.34(0.37)                      3.06 (0.43)                    3.13 (0.42) 
 
The number in parentheses in the left-hand column indicates the maximum score for each rating scale. 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses; AM, autobiographical memory pToM, personal theory of mind; ToM, 
theory of mind. 
*p < .05, **p < .0005 
 
With respect to the AM events (in Session 2), as expected H.C.’s ratings relating to the 
recollection of AM events were significantly lower compared to those of controls, t = -4.22, p = 
.0005), zCC  = -4.11 [-5.55, -2.66]. In terms of the ratings assessing likeness to an actual memory, 
no significant differences emerged between H.C. and controls for the pToM and ToM events in 
Session 1 or Session 2 (pToM Session 1 and Session 2, t = -0.90, p = .39, zCC  = -0.91 [1.46, -
0.35), and  t = -0.12, p = .90, zCC  = -0.12 [-0.58, 0.35], respectively, and ToM Session 1 and 
Session 2, t = -0.82, p = .42, zCC  =  -0.84[-1.38, -0.29], and t = -0.21, p = .83, zCC = -0.22 [-0.68,  
0.25], respectively).  
With respect to vividness, H.C.’s ratings for the AM events were significantly lower than 
that of controls, t = -2.13, p = .02; zCC  = -2.19 [-3.04, -1.32], whereas no significant differences 
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emerged for the pToM and ToM events across both testing sessions (pToM Session 1: t = -0.75, 
p = .47; zCC = -0.77 [-1.29, -0.23]; pToM Session 2: t = 0.77, p = .45, zCC = 0.79 [0.25, 1.31]; 
ToM Session 1: t = -2.16, p = .046; zCC = 2.21[-3.08, -1.30], and ToM Session 2: t = 0.17, p = 
.87, zCC = 0.17 [-0.30, 0.63]). 
Percent Signal Change 
 
In order to investigate differences in activation between H.C. and controls, percent signal 
change was examined within bilateral hippocampus
1
 (Figure 5.1) and extrahippocampal regions 
(Figure 5.2) for the AM, pToM, and ToM events. 
AM. 
 
Relative to controls, H.C. exhibited significantly greater percent signal change within the 
left hippocampus, t = 2.86, p = .01, zCC = 2.94 [1.85, 4.01], and left PCC, t = 2.84, p = .01, zCC = 
2.91 [1.83, 3.98]. A trend in the same direction was observed within the left ventrolateral PFC, t 
= 1.82, p = .09, zCC = 1.87 [1.08, 2.63]. In contrast, no significant differences were observed 
within the right hippocampus, t = 0.68, p = .51, zCC = 0.69 [0.17, 1.20], left medial PFC, t = -
0.47, p = .64, zCC = -0.48 [-0.97, 0.01], left temporal pole, t = 1.70, p = .11, zCC = 1.74 [0.99, 
2.47], and right temporal pole, t = -0.61, p = .55, zCC = -0.63 [-1.12, -0.11]. 
pToM. 
 
For Session 1, comparisons between H.C. and controls revealed no differences in percent 
signal change for any of the regions examined, including the left hippocampus, t = -0.19, p = 
0.85, zCC = -0.19 [-0.66, 0.28], right hippocampus, t = -0.61, p = .55, zCC = -0.63 [-1.12, -0.11], 
left medial PFC, t = -1.43, p = .17, zCC = -1.46 [-2.13, -0.78], left ventrolateral PFC, t = 1.52, p = 
.15, zCC = 1.56 [0.85, 2.24], left PCC, t = 1.58, p = 0.13, zCC = 1.62 [0.90, 2.33], left temporal 
                                                 
1
 Note that when the hippocampus was divided into anterior (head) and posterior (body and tail) segments, the same 
pattern of results was generally observed across AM, pToM, and ToM events. 
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pole, t = -1.02, p = 0.32, zCC = -1.05 [-1.62, -0.46], and right temporal pole, t = -0.86, p = .40, zCC 
= -0.89 [-1.42, -0.33]. 
For Session 2, H.C. showed significantly greater percent signal change within the left 
PCC, t = 3.93, p = .001, zCC = 4.04 [2.61, 5.46], and a trend in the same direction within the left 
ventrolateral PFC, t = 1.83, p = .09, zCC = 1.88 [1.09, 2.65]. However, no group differences were 
observed within the left hippocampus, t = 1.73, p = .10, zCC = 1.78 [1.02, 2.52], right 
hippocampus, t = 0.83 p = .42, zCC = 0.85 [0.30, 1.39], left medial PFC, t = -0.04, p = .97, zCC = -
0.04 [-0.50, 0.43], left temporal pole, t = 1.54, p = .14, zCC = 1.58 [0.87, 2.27], and right temporal 
pole, t = -0.87, p = .40, zCC = -0.89 [-1.43, -0.3].  
ToM. 
 
For Session 1, no group differences in percent signal change were observed for any of the 
regions examined, including the left hippocampus, t = 0.01, p = .99, zCC = 0.01[-0.45, 0.47], right 
hippocampus, t = -0.07, p = .94, zCC = -0.08 [-0.54, 0.39], left medial PFC, t = -0.90, p = .38, zCC 
= -0.93 [-1.48, -0.37], left PCC, t = 0.92, p = .37, zCC = 0.95 [0.38, 1.50], left ventrolateral PFC, t 
= 0.93, p = .36, zCC = 0.96 [0.39, 1.51], left temporal pole, t = -0.31, p = .76, zCC = -0.32 [-0.78, 
0.16], and right temporal pole, t = -0.88, p = .39, zCC = -0.90 [-1.44, -0.34]. 
 For Session 2, relative to controls, H.C. exhibited greater percent signal change within 
the PCC, t = 2.6, p = .02, zCC = 2.67 [1.66 to 3.67]; no group differences were observed within 
the left hippocampus, t = 0.75, p = .46, zCC = 0.77 [0.23, 1.29], right hippocampus, t = 0.43, p = 
.67, zCC = 0.45 [-0.05, 0.93], left medial PFC, t = .08, p = .94, zCC = 0.083 [-0.38, 0.55], left 
ventrolateral PFC (t = 1.51, p = .15, zCC = 1.55 [0.85, 2.24], left temporal pole, t = 0.43, p = .67, 
zCC = 0.45 [-0.05, 0.93], and right temporal pole, t = -0.91, p = .37, zCC = -0.94 [-1.48, -0.37]. 
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Figure 5.1. Coronal Slices Showing Hippocampal Activation in H.C. in Response to the (A) AM (B) 
pToM, and C) ToM. The images are thresholded at p < .05, uncorrected. The bar graphs depict mean 
percent signal change in left and right hippocampus. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
* p < .05 
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Figure 5.2. The Bar Graphs Depict the Mean Percent Signal Change in H.C. and Controls for (A) AM (B) pToM, 
and (C) ToM Events. Regions include the left medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), left ventrolateral PFC (VLPFC), left 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and bilateral temporal pole (TP). Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.  
*p < .09, ** p < .05 
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fMRI Analyses Within in H.C. 
 
A contrast between the BOLD signal associated with the AM events that H.C. rated as 
“remember” versus those she rated as “familiar” or “don’t know” revealed no differential activity 
within the hippocampus (see Figure 5.3). Similarly, a contrast between the AM events H.C. rated 
as vividly recollected versus those rated as vaguely recollected also revealed no differential 
activity within the hippocampus (see Figure 5.3). Even at a more relaxed threshold (p < .05), no 
differences emerged within the hippocampus. 
 
 
                A)     B)   
 
 
Figure 5.3. Differential fMRI Activity in H.C. (A) AM events H.C. remembered versus those she rated as familiar or 
was unable to recall and (B) AM events H.C. rated as vividly recollected versus those she rated as vaguely 
recollected. Both coronal images are at a threshold of p < .01, uncorrected, voxel size > 5).  
 
 
Functional Connectivity Between the PCC and ROIs 
 
In order to investigate differences in functional connectivity between H.C. and controls, 
regional temporal correlations between the PCC (seed region) and other brain regions within the 
common core network were examined for all three conditions
2
 (Table 5.2).  
                                                 
2
 Functional connectivity analyses were also computed using the hippocampus as a seed region. These analyses also 
revealed no differences in connectivity between H.C. and the control group across AM, pToM, and ToM events. 
 
L             y = -16                  R L             y = -16                  R 
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AM. 
 
With respect to AM, comparisons between H.C. and controls revealed no differences in 
functional connectivity between the PCC and the following regions: left hippocampus, t = 1.71, p 
= .10), zCC = 1.76 [1.00, 2.50], right hippocampus, t = 0.81, p = .43, zCC = 0.833 [0.29, 1.36],  
left medial PFC, t = -0.48, p = .64, zCC = -0.49 [-0.98, 0.01], left ventrolateral PFC, t = -0.18, p = 
.86, zCC = -0.19 [-0.65, 0.28], left temporal pole, t = 0.32, p = .75, zCC = 0.33 [-0.15, 0.81], and 
right temporal pole, t = 0.40, p = .70, zCC = 0.41 [-0.08, 0.88]. 
pToM. 
 
For both pToM Session 1 and Session 2, comparisons between H.C. and controls 
revealed no differences in functional connectivity between the PCC and the following regions: 
left hippocampus (Session 1: t = 0.64, p = .53, zCC = 0.66 [0.14, 1.16], Session 2: t = 0.96, p = 
.35, zCC = 0.99 [0.41, 1.55]), right hippocampus (Session 1: t = 0.25, p = .80, zCC = 0.26 [-0.22, 
0.72], Session 2: t = -1.70, p = .11, zCC = -1.75 [-2.48, -0.99]), left medial PFC (Session 1: t = 
0.62, p = .54, zCC = 0.64 [0.12, 1.14], Session 2: t = -1.03, p = .32, zCC = -1.06 [-1.63, -0.47]), left 
ventrolateral PFC (Session1: t = 1.75, p = .10, zCC = 1.80 [1.03, 2.55], Session 2: t = 1.60, p =.13, 
zCC = 1.64 [0.91, 2.35]), left temporal pole (Session1: t = -0.76, p = .46, zCC = -0.78 [-1.30, -
0.24], Session 2: t = 0.77, p =.45, zCC = 0.792 [0.25, 1.32]), and right temporal pole (Session 1: t 
= -0.91, p = .38; zCC = -0.94 [-1.48, -0.37], Session 2: t = 0.36, p = .72, zCC = 0.37 [-0.11, 0.84]). 
ToM. 
 
For both Session 1 and Session 2 comparisons between H.C. and controls revealed no 
differences in functional connectivity between the PCC and the following regions: left 
hippocampus (Session 1: t = 0.02, p = .98, zCC = 0.03 [-0.44, 0.49], Session 2: t = 0.06, p = .96, 
zCC = 0.06 [-0.41, 0.52]), right hippocampus (Session 1: t = 0.24 , p = .82, zCC = -0.244 [-0.71, 
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0.23], Session 2: t = -0.41, p = .70, zCC = -0.42 [-0.89, 0.07]), left medial PFC (Session1: t = -
0.70, p = .50, zCC = -0.72 [-1.23, -0.19], Session 2: t = -0.70, p = .49, zCC = -0.722 [-1.23, -
0.192]), left ventrolateral PFC (Session 1: t = 0.61, p = .55, zCC = 0.62 [0.11, 1.12], Session 2: t =  
-0.14, p = .89, zCC = -0.14 [-0.60, 0.33]), left temporal pole (Session 1: t  = -0.90, p = .38, zCC = -
0.92 [-1.47, -0.36], Session 2: t = 0.01, p = .99, zCC = 0.007 [-0.46, 0.47]), and right temporal 
pole (Session 1: t = -0.82, p = .42, zCC = -0.84 [-1.37, -0.29], Session 2: t =  0.02, p = .98, zCC = 
0.02 [-0.44, 0.48]). 
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Table 5.2 
 
The Mean Correlation Coefficients Between the PCC and Other Brain Regions Within the Common Core 
Network for AM, pToM, and ToM.  
 
AM 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 L. mPFC L. VLPFC L. Hippo R. Hippo L. TP R. TP 
 
H.C. Session 2 
 
 
.556 
 
 
.244 
 
 
.504 
 
 
.395 
 
 
.272 
 
 
.230 
 
Controls 
 
.637 
 
.272 
 
.335 
 
.300 
 
.221 
 
.174 
 
SD .165 
 
.150 
 
.096 
 
.114 
 
.154 
 
.137 
 
 
 
pToM 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 L. mPFC L. VLPFC L. Hippo R. Hippo L. TP R. TP 
 
H.C Session 1 
 
 
.758 
 
 
.533 
 
 
.373 
 
 
.326 
 
 
.109 
 
 
.055 
 
H.C. Session 2 
 
.381 
 
.511 
 
.408 
 
.122 
 
.313 
 
.196 
 
Controls 
 
.616 
 
.288 
 
.303 
 
.300 
 
.210 
 
.156 
 
SD .222 
 
.136 
 
.106 
 
.102 
 
.130 
 
.108 
 
 
 
ToM 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 L. mPFC L. VLPFC L. Hippo R. Hippo L. TP R. TP 
 
H.C Session 1 
 
 
.433 
 
 
.401 
 
 
.298 
 
 
.220 
 
 
.071 
 
 
-.011 
 
H.C. Session 2 
 
.432 
 
.259 
 
.302 
 
.198 
 
.211 
 
.157 
 
Controls 
 
.572 
 
.285 
 
.295 
 
.251 
 
.210 
 
.153 
 
SD .194 
 
.186 
 
.120 
 
.127 
 
.151 
 
.195 
 
Note. No differences emerged for any of the comparisons between H.C. and controls. 
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AM = autobiographical memory condition; pToM = theory of mind condition involving personally known others; 
ToM = theory of mind condition involving unknown others; L = left; R = right; mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex; 
PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; VLPFC = ventrolateral PFC; Hippo = hippocampus; TP = temporal pole; SD = 
standard deviation. 
 
Discussion 
 
In the current study, the neural basis of recollection and imagining abilities were 
examined in the developmental amnesic patient H.C., who experienced 30% hippocampal 
volume loss bilaterally. Behaviourally, H.C. was shown to be impaired in generating details 
relating to AM events and pToM events involving personally familiar others, but was 
indistinguishable from controls when generating details of ToM events involving unfamiliar 
others. Despite dissociations in behavioural performance, ROI analyses revealed that H.C. 
activated the same brain regions as healthy controls, including bilateral hippocampus, left medial 
PFC, left PCC, left ventrolateral PFC, and bilateral temporal poles. Similarly, H.C. showed the 
same functional connectivity pattern as controls across all three conditions. These findings 
suggest that hippocampal activation and preserved functional connectivity may not necessarily 
differentiate preserved versus impaired behavioural performance on closely matched conditions. 
Hippocampal Activation 
 
The most intriguing finding of the present study was the observation of robust bilateral 
hippocampal activation by H.C. across AM, pToM, and ToM conditions despite dissociations in 
behavioural performance and bilateral hippocampal volume loss. To further determine whether 
this hippocampal activation represents functionally relevant activity, events that H.C. 
“remembered” were compared with those that she merely knew about or was unable to recall. A 
similar analysis was also conducted for the AM events H.C. rated as vividly recollected versus 
those she rated as vague. The logic here is that if the activation is functionally relevant, then 
greater hippocampal activation should be evident during the “remembered” and vividly rated 
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events (Maguire et al., 2001). Interestingly, no differences in hippocampal activation emerged; 
instead, H.C. showed equivalent activation across these AM events, further suggesting that her 
hippocampal activity is not fully functional.   
There is some evidence in the literature that hippocampal activation does not always 
correlate with behavioural performance (Dickerson et al., 2005; Protzner, Kovacevic, Cohn, & 
McAndrews, 2013; Westmacott, Silver, & McAndrews, 2008). For example, in an fMRI study 
that required participants to learn and remember face-name pairs, low-performing older adults 
showed greater hippocampal activation compared with high-performing older adults (Miller et 
al., 2008). The authors suggested that the hyperactivation observed in the low-performing older 
adults may serve as a compensatory mechanism. In another study, Zamboni and colleagues 
examined memory performance in individuals with amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI) 
and demographically matched controls and found that the aMCI group demonstrated greater 
hippocampal activation compared with controls for both successful and unsuccessful memory 
recognition  trials (Zamboni et al., 2013). These findings led the authors to suggest that 
hippocampal activation in aMCI is nonspecific and is not reflective of behavioural performance. 
Similarly, Westmacott and colleagues (2008) reported robust hippocampal activation during 
unsuccessful memory recognition trials in an individual experiencing an episode of transient 
global amnesia (she rated 95% of the trials as ‘‘new”) in contrast to a baseline condition. The 
authors speculated that the pattern of results reflects processes based on attempts to retrieve the 
studied material. Finally, there is evidence that healthy older adults show hyperactivity in the 
CA3 region of the hippocampus when performance is impaired on a pattern separation task 
(Yassa, Lacy, Stark, Albert, & Stark, 2011). Given the spatial resolution used in the current 
106 
 
study, it was not possible to determine if H.C.’s hippocampal activation was restricted to a 
particular subfield or subfields, and this remains to be probed further. 
The possibility that H.C.’s remaining hippocampal tissue is contributing to task 
performance cannot be ruled out. In fact, this may account for why H.C.’s behavioural 
performance on the family photos task is not at floor on any of the conditions examined (see 
Experiment 3). It is possible that H.C.’s damaged hippocampus is less efficient at 
remembering/imagining, and as a result the increased activity reflects compensatory recruitment 
of additional resources (even to achieve suboptimal performance). That H.C.’s remaining 
hippocampal tissue may be functional is in line with neuroimaging findings reported in the 
developmental case Jon (Maguire et al., 2001). However, unlike H.C., Jon exhibited greater 
hippocampal activity only during events he clearly remembered versus those he merely knew 
about. Differences in hippocampal activation between H.C. and Jon may be due to differences in 
hippocampal pathology. Even though they are both developmental amnesic individuals, Jon’s 
selective bilateral hippocampal pathology was induced by perinatal hypoxic–ischemic episodes 
(Maguire et al., 2001), whereas there is evidence that H.C.’s hippocampal damage occurred in 
the early stages of fetal development (Rosenbaum et al., in preparation; see also Olsen et al., 
2013). Anoxia typically results in relatively selective cell loss in the CA1 region of the 
hippocampus (Zola-Morgan, Squire, & Amaral, 1986), which is likely the case in Jon. In 
contrast, a recent high resolution MRI analysis of H.C.’s hippocampus showed reduced volume 
bilaterally across all hippocampal subfields and that H.C.’s damage may have been less 
extensive compare to that of Jon (Olsen et al., 2013).   
Another possibility is that H.C. may be engaging in a similar strategy as controls, 
however due to damage to the extended hippocampal system, the information cannot be 
107 
 
outputted by the hippocampus. Qualitative analysis of H.C.’s MRI scans indicates bilateral 
atrophy of the fornix (Olsen et al., 2013; Rosenbaum et al., in preparation), the major output 
pathway of the hippocampus. Thus, H.C.’s hippocampal activation may reflect task involvement, 
however given that the information cannot be sent to other brain structures, tasks dependent on 
the hippocampus are consequently affected (i.e., AM and pToM).   
Extrahippocampal Activations 
 
In Experiment 3, I showed that H.C.’s performance was intact on the ToM condition 
involving unfamiliar others and suggested that this is likely due to her relatively preserved 
semantic knowledge. Unlike AM, semantic memory is not dependent on the hippocampus but 
rather is supported by the left ventrolateral PFC and posterior temporal regions  (Martin & Chao, 
2001). Of note, in the current study H.C. showed strong left ventrolateral PFC activity during 
ToM for both Session 1 and Session 2, which may reflect her reliance on semantic memory. 
However, it should be mentioned that robust activation was observed in this region across all 
three conditions. Therefore, it may be the involvement of the left ventrolateral PFC region, and 
not the hippocampus, that contributed to H.C’s ability to produce some details in response to the 
AM and pToM events in Experiment 3. 
It is notable that during Session 2 (but not Session 1) H.C. elicited greater PCC activation 
than controls during the pToM and ToM conditions. It is possible that this increased activation 
reflects H.C.’s improved performance over time in that she generated a greater number of details 
in response to these events during the second testing session. This interpretation is consistent 
with the hypothesis that the PCC plays a central role in supporting internally directed cognition 
(Buckner et al., 2008; Raichle et al., 2001). Therefore, during Session 2 H.C. may have engaged 
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in greater internally directed thinking, which allowed her to produce more details in response to 
the pToM and ToM events.  
Functional Connectivity 
 
 Not only were regional activations in H.C. equivalent to what was observed in controls 
(and in some cases greater than controls) across all three conditions but so were measures of 
functional connectivity. These findings are at odds with other studies examining functional 
connectivity during autobiographical remembering, which show alterations in the AM network in 
individuals with hippocampal amnesia. For example, Maguire and colleagues (2001) found that 
relative to controls, for the few memories that were described by Jon as recollected, connectivity 
was relatively weak or absent between the parahippocampal cortex and the hippocampus but 
greater between the retrosplenial cortex and hippocampus, and between the retrosplenial cortex 
and medial frontal regions. Similarly, Addis and colleagues (2007) found that patients with left 
mesial temporal lobe epilepsy showed a significant change in connectivity throughout the AM 
network, such that they exhibited reduced connectivity with the hippocampus and enhanced 
connectivity among anterior and posterior midline regions. 
 It is also useful reviewing studies examining DMN connectivity in hippocampal amnesia, 
given that this network overlaps closely with the AM network. Such studies have produced 
mixed findings, with some work showing aberrant DMN connectivity (Hayes et al., 2012) and 
other studies demonstrating intact connectivity in patients with lesions restricted to the 
hippocampus (Rudebeck, Filippini, & Lee, 2013). Of note, these studies were carried out in 
individuals with adult-onset amnesia, and it is possible that normal resting-state networks are 
more likely to be observed when structural damage occurs early in life (Tyszka, Kennedy, 
Adolphs, & Paul, 2011). It remains unknown whether DMN connectivity is intact in H.C.  
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The failure to find altered neural activity in H.C. does not necessarily indicate that such 
alterations do not exist. However, it is important to note that they were not detectable using a 
comprehensive approach that employed the most commonly used fMRI methods (i.e., brain 
activation and functional connectivity). It is possible that functional alterations in H.C. are more 
subtle and not measurable with BOLD fMRI approaches.  
In conclusion, the current results suggest that measures of activation and functional 
connectivity do not necessarily distinguish between preserved and impaired behavioural 
performance on closely matched conditions in developmental amnesia. The present study 
highlights the importance of scanning patients with fMRI while completing cognitive tasks, 
particularly when performance is impaired. If not, researchers may mistakenly assume that the 
hippocampus is not activated during instances of impaired performance. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
General Discussion 
 
The purpose of the present set of experiments was to examine if, and under what 
conditions, AM supported by the hippocampus is related to, and benefits, ToM and imagining of 
other people’s experiences. To this end, I attempted to address two main research questions: 
1. Are AM difficulties caused by early-onset hippocampal damage associated with 
impaired performance on standard measures of ToM (Experiment 1)? 
2. Is AM and the brain regions that support it involved to a greater extent in imagining 
the experiences of personally known others compared to unknown others 
(Experiments 2, 3, and 4)?  
In this general discussion, I first summarize the key findings from each of the four 
experiments. I then discuss the theoretical and clinical implications of these findings, and finally 
demonstrate how these results set the stage for future research examining AM and ToM. 
Summary of the Experiments 
 
In Experiment 1, I tested whether the development of AM is critical for the development 
of ToM. To do so, ToM abilities were examined in H.C., a young woman with impaired AM 
development due to early hippocampal damage. In this study, I showed that H.C. performed at 
the same level as controls on a wide range of commonly used ToM tests. These findings provide 
convincing evidence that the normal development of AM is not critical for the development of 
ToM, at least as measured by standard ToM tests. These results suggest caution be used when 
interpreting correlations in neuroimaging or behavioural data as causal.  
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In Experiment 2, I scanned healthy individuals with fMRI to test whether different neural 
and cognitive mechanisms support imagining the mental experiences of personally known others 
(pToM) versus unknown others (ToM) and how these abilities relate to AM. I showed that the 
brain regions supporting AM and pToM showed greater neural overlap compared to those 
supporting pToM and ToM. Of note, the greatest degree of overlap between AM and pToM was 
within midline regions. A complementary finding was striking neural differences between pToM 
and ToM, such that midline regions associated with AM predominated during pToM, whereas 
more lateral regions associated with social semantic memory predominated during ToM. These 
findings suggest that there are multiple routes to ToM and the extent to which each memory 
system is recruited during ToM depends, at least in part, on whether the target person is 
personally known or unknown. 
Experiment 3 corroborated the neuroimaging results from Experiment 2 by showing that 
H.C., a developmental amnesic case, was impaired at producing detailed descriptions of events 
relating to her own past as well as events relating to personally known others. In contrast, she 
had no difficulty describing events relating to unknown others. These findings, therefore, suggest 
that hippocampally mediated AM and the processes that support it may be more essential when 
imagining the experiences of personally known others and that extrahippocampal regions are 
sufficient to support imagining events from the perspective of unknown others.  
Finally, in Experiment 4, I used fMRI to explore the neural basis of the results reported in 
Experiment 3. In that experiment H.C. was shown to be impaired in generating details relating to 
AM events and pToM events involving personally familiar others, but showed intact 
performance when generating details relating to ToM events involving unfamiliar others. Despite 
dissociations in behavioural performance, ROI and functional connectivity analyses revealed no 
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neural differences between H.C. and controls across AM, pToM, and ToM events. These finding 
suggest that measures of activation and functional connectivity do not necessarily distinguish 
between preserved and impaired behavioural performance in developmental amnesia. 
Taken together, using standard tests of ToM and the family photos task, these studies 
collectively demonstrate that AM and hippocampal function are more strongly related to 
imagining the mental experiences of personally known others relative to unknown others. 
Furthermore, in the face of hippocampal damage and impaired AM, regions outside the MTL are 
sufficient to support ToM but not pToM. I have speculated throughout this dissertation that ToM 
involving unfamiliar others can likely be achieved via reliance on social semantic memory 
supported by lateral frontal and temporal regions. 
The Role of the Common Core Network and the Hippocampus 
 
The current dissertation adds to the accumulating evidence that the network of regions 
traditionally associated with AM also plays a crucial role in other high-level, non-mnemonic 
cognitive processes. The majority of research in this area has focused on the relationship 
between AM and future thinking (Addis et al., 2009, 2007; Schacter et al., 2008; Schacter et al., 
2012; Szpunar et al., 2007). fMRI and patient work examining these two abilities consistently 
show that they are intimately related. Without the current research, a similar relationship 
between AM and ToM might have been assumed based on qualitative and quantitative reviews 
of the neuroimaging literature (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Spreng et 
al., 2009). Importantly, the present set of studies highlight that even though AM, pToM, and 
ToM engage a common set of regions, AM and ToM (but not pToM) are dissociable. Taken 
together, this work underscores the importance exploring commonalities based on neuroimaging 
studies in patient populations. For instance, recent work has shown that at least some aspects of 
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future thinking and spatial memory are spared in episodic amnesia despite studies showing 
overlap in the brain regions that they recruit (Kwan, Craver, Green, Myerson, & Rosenbaum, 
2013; Rosenbaum et al., 2000). 
              A number of theories have been proposed to account for the neural correspondence 
observed across AM, ToM, future thinking, and spatial navigation. Buckner and Carroll (2007) 
proposed that “self-projection” is the common process linking these diverse abilities together, 
which they define as the ability to mentally project oneself from the present moment into other 
times, places, and perspectives. This theory emphasizes the role of the MTL memory system and 
suggests that past memories enable one to build mental models and simulations of what might 
happen in the future or what another person might be thinking and/or feeling.  
By contrast, building on cognitive map theory (O’keefe & Nadel, 1978), Hassabis and 
Maguire (2007) proposed that scene construction (i.e., the retrieval and integration of relevant 
spatial information to produce a coherent context) is the common element driving the core 
pattern of activity. The authors posited that the hippocampus is central to this process which in 
turn supports AM, spatial navigation, imagining new experiences, future thinking, and ToM. 
Evidence supporting their theory was based on (a) the observation that the core network is 
engaged when individuals imagine fictitious scenes that have no relationship to the self or time 
and (b) the finding that individuals with amnesia are impaired at imagining atemporal fictitious 
scenes that do not involve the self (Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, 
Vann, et al., 2007).  
A third theory proposed to account for the neural correspondence across these diverse 
cognitive abilities is the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, which highlights that 
personal memories are not literal representations of the past, but instead, involve reassembling 
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and binding together event details from stored memories (Schacter & Addis, 2007). This 
hypothesis was put forth to account for the neural overlap observed between past and future 
thinking, although it can easily be extended to include ToM (Rabin et al., 2010). That is, 
individuals may recombine details stored in memory to imagine and simulate the experiences of 
other people.  
 Although I did not directly test any of these theories, the present results bear relevance to 
the theories as they relate to AM and ToM. All three theories emphasize the role of the 
MTL/hippocampus and suggest that AM is crucial for the expression of ToM, among other 
abilities. Thus according to these theories, damage to this memory system should impair ToM. 
For example, if self-projection is driving the common core network then we would expect H.C, a 
person with hippocampal damage, to be equally impaired at projecting herself into the 
perspective of a personally known other as well as an unknown other. Similarly, if the retrieval 
and recombination of details is critical to imagining events from other people’s perspectives then 
we would once again expect H.C. to perform poorly on both pToM and ToM conditions. 
Critically, this was not observed in the present set of studies, but rather H.C. performed well on 
ToM tasks involving unfamiliar others and poorly on tasks involving personally known others 
(Experiment 1 and Experiment 3). Therefore, in order to accommodate the present results, a 
more flexible theory that draws on multiple processes is needed. 
The results from the current dissertation, therefore, appear to be more consistent with a 
recent proposal put forth by Spreng and Mar (2012). These authors suggest that the neural 
overlap observed across AM and ToM may facilitate the integration of personal and 
interpersonal information, which provides a means for personal experiences to become social 
conceptual knowledge that in turn guides one’s social behaviour. The integration of this 
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knowledge may also support the generation of personality models that enable individuals to 
accurately predict other people’s behaviour (Hassabis et al., 2013). 
Building on these ideas and taking the current findings into account, I suggest that in 
healthy individuals, ToM can be achieved by relying on an interplay between AM and semantic 
memory, and that in the face of AM impairment, semantic memory is sufficient to support some 
types of ToM abilities. These ideas are further discussed below. 
How is ToM Achieved? 
 
Based on the results of the current dissertation, I propose that in healthy individuals there 
are at least two routes to inferring and imagining what another person is thinking and/or feeling. 
One route involves access to past experiences mediated by the hippocampus and a second route 
relies on semantic memory and general reasoning abilities supported by extrahippocampal 
regions. Importantly, however, these strategies are not viewed as mutually exclusive, but rather 
AM and semantic memory are believed to interact during ToM. This idea is similar to the 
transformation theory, which posits that there is a dynamic interaction between AM supported by 
the hippocampus and semanticized versions of the original memory supported by the neocortex. 
Importantly, both types of memories can co-exist in the brain, and situational demands will 
influence which memory type predominates at retrieval (Winocur & Moscovitch, 2011; Winocur 
et al., 2010; see also Moscovitch et al., 2005, 2006; Rosenbaum et al., 2001). 
The idea that AM and semantic memory interact is consistent with recent empirical 
studies suggesting that the DMN is composed of at least two distinct yet interacting subsystems: 
a medial temporal subsystem and a dorsal medial subsystem, both of which converge on midline 
regions (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). The medial temporal subsystem closely resembles the 
brain regions that support AM, whereas the latter network closely resembles the regions that 
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support semantic memory. Thus, these interacting subsystems may be responsible for retrieving 
and combining information stored in AM and semantic memory in order to infer other people’s 
thoughts and feelings during ToM, and the extent to which each memory system is involved will 
depend, at least in part, on who the target person is. 
Based on the current findings, I propose that reliance on AM may be the preferred 
strategy for imagining the experiences of personally known others, whereas reliance on semantic 
memory may predominate during ToM involving unfamiliar others. Indeed, knowing someone 
for a long period of time and observing that person’s behaviour in different situations provides a 
rich source of information on which one can draw when imagining that person’s mental states 
and experiences. In contrast, reliance on semantic memory, such as social semantic scripts, may 
be beneficial when imagining how an unknown person would think and act in a given situation. 
In such instances, we may rely on scripts of how the average person would likely respond in a 
given situation. For example, on would probably expect the average individual to feel depressed 
after losing his/her job and overjoyed after learning he/she won the lottery.   
In the face of AM impairment, the semantic memory system is likely sufficient to support 
some types of ToM abilities, such as those tapped by standard ToM tests and ToM tasks 
involving imagining the experiences of unknown others. Indeed, this type of ToM is likely based 
on schemas or generic information that is already bound together and does not require access to 
past episodes. In contrast, access to AM appears to be necessary for relating to experiences 
involving personally known others. It remains to be determined, however, whether semantic 
memory is also necessary for pToM, such that imagining the experiences of personally familiar 
others requires access to both AM and semantic memory (see future directions for further 
discussion on this topic). Indeed, recent patient work has demonstrated that both AM and 
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semantic memory are crucial for future imagining abilities (Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 
2012). 
It is possible that other variables, in addition to one’s relationship with the target person, 
play a role in mediating the relationship between AM and ToM. For example, a recent study 
showed that participants recounted more semantic memories when responding to narratives 
relating to the protagonists’ physical actions, and recalled more AMs when responding to 
narratives about the protagonists’ mental qualities, predicaments, and accomplishments (Yang, 
Bossmann, Schiffhauer, Jordan, & Immordino-Yang, 2012). Personality factors and social-
perceptual cues may also play a role in the extent to which AM versus semantic memory is 
involved during ToM. However, it remains for future research to determine how these different 
variables interact to influence the predominant strategy employed to infer or imagine another 
person’s experience during ToM. 
Clinical Implications 
 
The present findings have important implications for how we understand and define 
amnesia. Amnesia is currently defined as an isolated deficit in AM in the context of preserved 
cognitive abilities including spared intelligence, working memory, semantic memory, attention, 
executive functioning, and visuospatial abilities. However, based on the current set of results 
along with other recent data (Andelman et al., 2010; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007; 
Kwan et al., 2010; Race et al., 2011), it appears that amnesia results in deficits that extend 
beyond autobiographical remembering, including impairments in imagining the perspectives of 
personally known others, imagining the future, and constructing detailed scenes. Such findings 
have important implications for health-care professionals who diagnose and treat individuals 
with hippocampal amnesia, which can arise from a number of different etiologies, including 
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hypoxic-ischemic injury (e.g., due to cardiac arrest, asphyxiation, carbon monoxide poisoning), 
infectious disease (e.g., herpes encephalitis), stroke (particularly involving the posterior cerebral 
artery), traumatic brain injury, and Alzheimer’s disease. 
In Experiment 3, if it is the case that H.C. relied on her relatively preserved semantic 
memory of situations relating to unknown others, it is interesting that she did not employ this 
strategy for events relating to personally known others. As mentioned in the discussion of that 
experiment, it would be interesting to investigate whether H.C. could be probed in a manner that 
would promote reliance on semantic memory when imagining personally known others’ 
experiences. If so, this idea may serve as an important starting point for research aimed at 
developing new strategies to help improve AM and pToM abilities in individuals with 
hippocampal damage.   
Future Directions 
 
Although the current dissertation provides critical insight into the neural and functional 
relationship between AM, pToM, and ToM, several important questions remain unanswered. As 
mentioned previously, it will be important to replicate the present results in other developmental 
amnesic individuals and to investigate whether the current findings extend to those who sustain 
damage in adulthood. Currently, there is only one other study that supports the finding that AM 
development is not necessary for the development or expression of ToM. In a recent study, 
Staniloiu and colleagues tested a young male with developmental amnesia due to perinatal 
hypoxia on standard measures of ToM as well as tests of social perception, empathy, social 
judgment, and social regulation (cognitive control, emotion regulation, monitoring/error 
correction, self-reflection, deception; Staniloiu, Borsutzky, Woermann, & Markowitsch, 2013). 
Consistent with the results reported in Experiment 1, the patient showed largely preserved 
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performance on standard ToM measures, but was impaired on tasks tapping more complex social 
judgment and perception (e.g., incongruent affective prosody processing, performance on the 
Ultimatum Game). The authors suggested that these impairments may relate to the patient’s 
reduced amygdala and basal ganglia volume or alternatively to deficits in relational processing 
that are likely needed to perform well on these complex tasks. Future studies are needed to 
discern among these possibilities. Furthermore, although no other study has formally assessed 
amnesic individuals’ performance on ToM measures involving personally known others, there is 
some anecdotal evidence supporting this idea. For example, it was reported that M.L., the same 
amnesic patient who performed well on the standard ToM tests (Rosenbaum et al. 2007), had 
difficulty in knowing how to behave around family members and friends following his injury 
(Spreng & Mar, 2012).  
Further neuroimaging research might also help to further understand the nature of H.C.’s 
hippocampal activation during instances of preserved and impaired behavioural performance. 
One way to further investigate this finding is to employ high-resolution BOLD fMRI while she 
completes the family photos task. This would allow us to investigate neural activity within the 
different hippocampal subfields. It may be the case that like other studies (Yassa et al., 2011), 
H.C.’s robust hippocampal activation is associated with the CA3 region of the hippocampus. 
Structural techniques, such as diffusion tensor imaging may also prove to be useful in helping us 
understand H.C.’s robust hippocampal activation.  
Further investigations should also examine the role of semantic memory in ToM. In the 
current dissertation, I speculated that H.C. is likely relying on her relatively intact semantic 
memory in order to perform well on the standard ToM tests (Experiment 1) and to imagine the 
experiences of unfamiliar others on the family photos task (Experiment 3). However, this idea 
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was not formally tested in the current set of experiments. As mentioned earlier, previous work 
assessing individuals with semantic dementia have demonstrated that these patients are impaired 
on a wide range of standard ToM tests. However, it remains unknown whether semantic memory 
is also necessary for imagining the experiences of personally familiar others. Indeed, AM and 
semantic memory are both necessary for future imagining future events (Irish et al., 2012). Thus, 
an important next step is to examine how individuals with semantic dementia perform on the 
family photos task or other ToM tasks that employ personally familiar others. 
A final question worthy of future investigation is exactly how AM contributes to pToM 
and ToM in healthy individuals. For example, do past episodes implicitly influence current social 
processing? Are specific episodes brought to mind in order to better understand what another 
person is thinking and/or feeling? Alternatively, are details from past episodes recombined in 
novel ways during pToM and ToM, as suggested by the constructive episodic simulation theory 
(Schacter & Addis, 2007)? 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of the present set of experiments was to examine if, and under what 
conditions, AM supported by the hippocampus benefits ToM. Using a combination of 
behavioural and neuroimaging methods, I demonstrated that AM and the hippocampus are more 
essential for ToM tasks that involve personally familiar others compared with unknown others. 
In contrast, regions outside the MTL are likely sufficient to support ToM involving unfamiliar 
others. These results suggest that ToM is not dependent on a single process, but rather comprises 
a rich set of mechanisms for understanding other people’s experiences. Overall, these results 
contribute substantially to our current understanding of the functional and neural relationship 
between AM and ToM, and add to the literature suggesting that the hippocampus plays a broader 
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role in cognition beyond that of recalling past events. It is my hope that these studies stimulate 
new avenues of research that help us better understand the role of the hippocampus in mnemonic 
and non-mnemonic cognitive abilities.  
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Appendix A 
 
Figure A.1. Narrative Sample from Levine et al. (2002) Illustrating the Autobiographical 
Interview Scoring Procedure. Internal details include event, place, perception (percep), 
time, thought/emotion (T/Em) and External details include external events (ext. event), 
semantic, and repetitions. 
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Appendix B 
 
Neuropsychological profile of H.C. 
 
Table B.1 
 
 
                Test                                                                                           Normed Score 
 
 
General Intellectual Function 
  WASI Verbal IQ (percentile)  
 
61
st
 
WASI Performance IQ (percentile) 
 
66
th
 
WASI Full Scale IQ (percentile) 66
th
 
AM-NART (standard score)  
 
101 (estimated FSIQ) 
 
  Semantic Knowledge and Academic Attainment 
 WASI Vocabulary (T-score)  
 
55 
WAIS-III Information (scaled score)  12 
WAIS-III Arithmetic (scaled score)  8 
 
  Language Production 
  Boston Naming Test (z-score)
1
  0.75 
Semantic Fluency (animals) (percentile)  > 90th 
 
  Anterograde Memory 
  WMS-III∗ 
  Logical Memory I – immediate recall (scaled score)  4 
Logical Memory II – delayed recall (scaled score)  1 
California Verbal Learning Test-II 
      total trials 1–5 (T-score) 
 
38 
     short delay free recall (z-score)  -4 
     long delay free recall (z-score) -3 
     recognition (z-score)  
 
-2 
Rey Osterrieth complex figure
2∗ 
      immediate recall (T-score) 
 
 <20 
     delayed recall (T-score)  
 
 <20 
     delayed recognition – total correct (T-score)  22 
 
  Visuospatial Function 
  WASI Block Design (T-score)  54 
Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure – Copy (percentile)  > 16th 
Judgement of Line Orientation (percentile)  56th 
Benton Facial Recognition (percentile)  33–59th 
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Table B.1 cont. 
 
 
                 Test                                                                                          Normed Score 
 
 
Attention and Executive Function 
Stroop
3
 
  Word full (seconds) (z-score)  3.65 
Colour full (seconds) (z-score)  −0.03 
Interference full (seconds) (z-score)  −0.57 
Word errors (z-score)  
 
0 
Colour errors (z-score)  
 
−0.5 
Interference errors (z-score)  −0.13 
Word self-corrections (z-score)  −0.5 
Colour self-corrections (z-score)  −0.71 
Interference self-corrections 
 
1.44 
Trail Making Test
1
 
       Part A (sec) (z-score)  
 
0.69 
     Part B (sec) (z-score)  
 
−0.23 
Phonemic Fluency (FAS) (percentile)
4 
 70–80th 
WASI Similarities (T-score)  
 
50 
WASI Matrix Reasoning (T-score)  55 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task – categories (T-score)5  57 
   
Processing Speed   
WAIS-III Digit Symbol (scaled score)   13 
WAIS-III Symbol Search (scaled score)  14 
   
Mood 
  CES-D
6 
 
 
no indication of depression 
PANAS 
       Positive Affect (z-score)  1.06 
     Negative Affect (z-score)  0.21 
 
 
Note: AM-NART, American National Adult Reading Test; WASI, Wechsler Abbreviated Scale 
of Intelligence; WAIS-III, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–III; CES-D, Center for 
Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale; PANAS, Positive and Negative Affectivity Scale 
1
Spreen & Strauss (1998) 
2
Meyers & Meyers (1996) 
3
in-house unpublished normative data 
4
Tombaugh, Kozak, & Rees (1996) 
5
Heaton et al. (1993) 
6
McDowell & Newell (1996) ∗17.8 years 
old at time of testing 
 
